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ABSTRACT

This Master's Research Project examines the manner in
which the City of Providence reviewed a development strategy
prepared by consultants for its downtown,

and attempted to

generate proposals for a fresh approach to central city
planning and management.

A profile of the existing political

milieu and economic environment are furnished as a context
for critiquing the consultants'
response to their findings.

report and the City's

Case studies of alternative

methods for promoting public-private partnerships in central
cities are then analyzed as a basis for the development of a
prototypical planning and management entity tailored to the
needs of downtown Providence,

(ii)

Rhode Island.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

"One of the great causes of problems is solutions."
Eric Severeid,

1976

"For every complex and difficult problem there is
one clear and simple solution -

and it's wrong."

H.L.

2

Mencken (Attrib.)

1.1

The research issue and objectives
With the submission of the Do~E!2~E Q~y~12E~~E! ~!E~!~BY

by consultants Carr. Lynch Associates and Melvin Levine and
Associates in March.

1986.

the City of Providence Department

of Planning and Development is faced with a complicated set
of choices for promoting stability and growth in the city
core.

The central question of this Master's Research Project

will be to identify the most beneficial policy options for
the creation of a lasting public-private sector pact.

geared

to stimulating downtown growth.
The analysis will deal first with substantive issues.
including:

a synopsis of Carr. Lynch's and Levine's work;

review and critique of the Strategy on its face;

a

and an

analysis of how downtown Providence is managed currently.
The second section will address policy and process issues.
including:
reception;

the City's response to the Strategy upon its
input mechanisms aimed at the downtown community

in formulating the Strategy (the establishment of a Downtown
Strategy Task Force.

consisting of professionals and local

experts); feedback mechanisms for assessing community
response to the Strategy (a survey instrument aimed at
downtown interest groups);
alternatives;

the generation of planning

and recommendations for policy adoption and

implementation.

1.2

Significance of the problem
The City of Providence is faced with analyzing the

3

efficacy of a thorough reworking of its downtown plans by
independent consultants.

The significance of such an

opportunity to the present-day planning student is that
Providence's downtown is a microcosm of the impacts of
current municipal fiscal
an integrated.

trends and of the potential for

institutionalized response to patterns of

urban decline.
With the curtailment of federal funding programs. which
for many years were a mainstay of local community budgets.
city governments have been forced to look to their own more
limited resources in the preservation of positive planning
practices.

Innovation has been spawned primarily by an

awareness of the need to stabilize tax bases in a highly
competitive economic environment.

an environment in which

current industrial and commercial location decisions may
dictate the health of a city in future decades.

The compound

effects of failing to promote a community's assets or
addressing its problems might prove to be devastating to the
economic and social health of an urban area. with
implications far beyond the limited boundaries of the CBD.
Urban areas have chosen to ameliorate the impacts of
dwindling funding sources in a number of ways.

Developing

public-private partnerships in downtown revitalization serves
both public and private interests by ensuring the more
efficient expenditure of capital.
the central city.

Keeping existing uses in

as well as attracting new uses to the core.

demands of urban planners skills not previously associated

4

with municipal government staff.

New management techniques

which bow to the requisites of private capital

(leveraging

that capital to behave in a manner which is conducive to the
public interest), while preserving a strong awareness of
wider community needs,

are paramount.

One outcome of this

new awareness is the concept of quasi-autonomous,
public downtown management entities or
Corporations'.

quasi-

'Downtown Management

as they have become known.

City legislatures are understanding the need to cede
some of their traditional public powers to newly designated
agencies with more specific roles and jurisdictions.
Clearly,

the problems faced by neighborhoods are not
Central city planning is

replicated in the urban core.

geared to furnishing both physical and policy infrastructures
designed to foster strong economic development:

ensuring the

construction and maintenance of an integrated physical
infrastructure;

providing free-flowing circulation and

adequate parking facilities;

offering loans at rates well

below market prime to supplement venture capital and to
improve space absorption levels;

providing strategic grant

injections into small scale projects which would not
otherwise be initiated;

coordinating the efforts of existing

public and private non-prof it agencies geared to servicing
downtown uses;

and actively marketing the downtown district,

the inventory of available space,

and the availability of

public monies and planning support.

5

1.3

The conceptual framework
While the goal of this study is to make purposeful

recommendations for planning in downtown Providence at the
'metapolicy'

level

tactical scale).

(that is.

the strategic rather than the

the approach is far from comprehensive.

limited fiscal resources of the municipality.

The

as well as the

major emphasis of the City Department of Planning and
Development on economic development issues.

dictate a

political milieu in which public-private partnership and a
project-by-project funding approach are mandated.

The

constraint of prevailing planning practice limits the choices
in theoretical alternatives for final recommendations in this
study.

An implicit objective of this thesis is to propose

realistic goals for implementation of a Downtown Development
Strategy.

the study for which has already been conducted by

carefully briefed consultants.

A personal.

academic

preference for freedom in venturing radical alternatives for
central city planning is therefore tempered by pre-existing
political and planning environments which.
Providence.

at least in

amount to one and the same entity.

For the most part.

then.

theoretical considerations will

not step outside the contextual framework set by the City of
Providence.

(As shall be demonstrated.

this has given rise

to enough internal conflict in and of itself.)

Rather.

a

less rationalized approach to the Carr-Lynch-Levine Strategy
and its implications for the city is reserved in reviewing
and critiquing (a)

the recommendations prescribed by the

6

Strategy

(Chapter 5)

and

(b)

alternatives for establishing a

new management agency specifically for the downtown area
(Chapters 9 and 10).
The aim of the thesis is to go beyond mere cataloging of
one task of the Providence Department of Planning and
Development; by analyzing the process of establishing an
experimental approach to downtown planning,

it is hoped that

considerable insight into the development of a fresh planning
paradigm will be achieved.

1.4

Procedures and methods of analysis
Because of the nature of the research,

the approach to

this study is qualitative rather than quantitative.
Methodologies include:
literature;

an extensive survey of the

telephone and face-to-face interviews with

downtown representatives from both public and private
sectors;

comparative analyses of the benefits of theoretical

models of downtown management;

commentary and criticism of

past and current practices of downtown management.
The use of grid matrices for the comparison of existing
downtown management functions,

by agency type and for the

assessment of functions and jurisdictions of experimental
management entities elsewhere in the U.S.A.
Chapters 6 and 9.

is applied in

Quantitative measures of social,

and economic trends are limited to Chapter 2.

fiscal

A limited

statistical analysis of the responses to a survey instrument,
designed to tap the mood of those most directly affected by

7

planned change in downtown. was conducted for the purposes of
Chapter 8.

1.5

Organization of the study
The principal recommendation of the Downtown Development

Strategy submitted to the City of Providence by Carr. Lynch
Associates and Melvin Levine and Associates is to establish
an implementation and management entity to oversee downtown
development.

This Master's Research Project will examine in

detail alternative theories for addressing short-term urban
decline and.

in particular.

the public and quasi-public

agencies selected by diverse American cities in attempting to
promote and manage growth.

The final chapter of the thesis

will attempt to set down concrete policy proposals for the
City of Providence as its agencies begin the complex task of
reviewing and adopting a new downtown plan.
The structure of this thesis is organized in two
sections:
I•

The Carr-Lynch-Levine Strategy:

Substantive Issues -

This section describes and analyses the work of the
consultants.

observing their report.

first as a self-

contained document apart from the milieu of downtown
Providence

(as an objective piece of research)

to provide a bridge to Section II.

and.

second.

the Strategy is critiqued

as a prescription for change within the milieu of the city.
II.

Policy and Process Issues:

Developing Planning and

Management for Downtown Providence.

8

Rhode Island -

The reception of the plan and the search for alternative
policies for its implementation are approached from two
standpoints.

First,

from the vantage point of the policy

makers as they grapple with the actuality of adopting a fresh
approach to downtown and,

second,

from a personal

interpretation of the experiences of other American cities
and the development of a hypothetical structure for planning
in Providence's core.

***
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SECTION I
THE CARR-LYNCH-LEVINE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

10

CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMY OF DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE:
THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING. EXISTING CONDITIONS
AND THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION

11

"Downtown Providence today appears to be in a
state of suspended animation.

just between

decline and renewal."
Carr. Lynch Associates.

1986

"Some think I'm too optimistic. but I believe
growth in Boston can't help but soon spill over
into Providence.

I'm betting on a symbiotic

relationship between the two cities.

and I'm not

the only one."
John Ryan.

"We're on a roll.

Providence realtor. 1986

and this is only the beginning."

Kenneth Orenstein. Executive Director.
Providence Foundation.

12

1986

2.1

Times have changed
In a recent article in ~~~!~E ~~~iE~~2 ~~z~~iE~·

the

author of an article on Rhode Island's capital city
substituted the names of Providence's first families for
those of the Massachusetts Brahmin.

thus:

"Here's to dear old Providence.
Home of johnny cakes and scrod.
Where Metcalfs speak only to Browns
And Browns speak only to God."
It is true that Providence's great philanthropists.
cultural figures and educators have commanded greater
national attention in recent decades than has its
contribution to the regional economy of New England.

Indeed.

as Caroline Knapp and Peter Kadzis

"By the

late 1950s Providence,

(1986)

have noted.

like many northeastern cities.

had

fallen from industrial grace and succumbed to urban grit".
A sustained period of virtually uninterrupted economic
growth from 1850 to the immediate post-war years gave way to
a seemingly unstoppable period of economic decline.

Only in

the mid-1980s have politicians found the resolve to tackle
Providence's problems head on.
Wall

~.!.!~~!

~~~EE~l

In a July.

1983 issue of the

a front page story denounced Rhode Island

as "the region's dowdy neighbor.

clinging to old gritty

industries and grappling with big economic problems".
Nowhere was the impact of this negative image -

read about

nationally by the nation's most influential investors more strongly than in the city of Providence.

13

felt

Despite the

overwhelming defeat of the QE~~~EEE2~ fE~E~£!

(perhaps the

only attempt at regional economic planning ever seen in Rhode
Island),

the stage was set for indignant politicians to sit

down together.

to bury the disruptive nature of partisan

Rhode Island politics,

and to contrive to overcome the

entrenched pattern of decline in the state's capital city.

2.2

The regional context
In the Proyi~~~£~ §E~~~Z ~EEE~~l

(October 5,

1986).

Froma Joselow described New England as the new "Star of the
American economy".

To understand the contextual setting for

economic circumstances in Providence,
are key.

recent regional events

An interim report by the Department of Commerce

reported by the Ocean State Business Development Authority in
its first

~E!~Elz ~~EEE!•

1986, states that New England has

the nation's lowest unemployment rate

(4.1 percent, compared

to the national average of 6.7 percent).
England worker has a personal income sources before taxes other eight regions.

of $15,387,
The U.S.

The average New

income from all

higher than any of the

average is $13,451.

It

appears that the words of John Naissbitt in his much-vaunted
work,

Me~~!E~~~~·

were far from prophetic:

shift is irreversible in our lifetime •••
give me Texas,

California and Florida,

other forty-seven".

"The North-South

For economic growth

and you can have the

With regard to the shift of population

southwards to the Sunbelt, Joselow (1986)
simply did not go".

14

notes,

"Most of us

New England survived the curse of the negative
prophesies,

to the surprise of many New Englanders

themselves,

perhaps because of two essential economic

ingredients which were added in 1980.

National policies

under Ronald Reagan began once more to favor defense oriented
industries and the emerging high technology fields.
England.

particularly eastern Massachusetts was strong in

Second,

both.

New

the price of oil ceased to increase and,

indeed, began to fall.

This stabilized costs for ailing New

England industries, while rendering the Sunbelt far less
attractive to potential migrants.
But within this rosy regional picture lie pockets of
decay which have not benefitted from the positive changes
experienced elsewhere.

As Jeff Taylor,

Director of Community

Development in Berlin, New Hampshire recently stated in the
Bo~!~~ Q1~£~

(September 8,

northern New England,

1986),

"When you lose a job in

the bus station is a better bet than
And within the flourishing

the local employment office".

economy of southern New England,

sandwiched between the

success stories of Connecticut and Massachusetts,

Rhode

Island seems very much the poor relative.
Within southeastern New England,
particular,

Rhode Island and,

in

Providence face competition from a number of

highly successful regional service centers.

Map 2.1 shows

the location of the state capital in relation to Boston,
Nashua,

Springfield,

New Haven and New York.

All of these

cities have shown marked economic recoveries in the first

15
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half of this decade.
EcOE£~Y

(1980-1986)

The Bank of

Boston's~~ ~E~l~EE

chronicles a widening gap between Rhode

Island and the rest of New England.

The state's hourly

manufacturing wage of $7.91 is the lowest in the region and
the fifth lowest in the nation.
$9.70 per hour.

The national average is

The difference between Rhode Island and New

England manufacturing wages has widened.

from 81 cents in

1982 to $1.02 in the first quarter of 1986.

In terms of

disposable income -

Rhode Islanders

net income after taxes -

average $13,620 compared with $15,200 for the region.
gap has also widened,

This

from $1,440 in 1984 to $1,580 in the

first quarter of 1986.
Robert Magaziner,
involved in the

one of the pioneering researchers

Q~EE£~~~ ££~£~£!•

noted in an interview

with the Pr£yi~~E£~ ~£~EE~! (October 5, 1986)

that in 1984

the number of jobs available in Rhode Island increased only 4
percent,

a figure somewhat less than the region's mean figure

of 5.6 percent and even the nation's mean of 4.7 percent.
For 1985, Magaziner cites Rhode Island Department of Economic
Development figures which indicate a worsening situation:
employment grew only 1.3 percent against New England's 3.7
percent and the nation's 3.3 percent.
Clearly,
economy.

a few key employers are sustaining the state's

Electric Boat

(a subsidiary of General Electric)

and Raytheon Corporation together provide some 8,500 jobs,
most of which are entirely dependent upon federal defense
contracts.

Magaziner estimates that should these contracts

17

not be renewed at current expenditure levels.

the state would

rapidly see an increase of one to 1.5 percentage points in
its unemployment rate.
To the extent that Rhode Island is holding its own
against an entrenched pattern of manufacturing decline.
a recent paper by William Jackson
University Research Foundation.

(1986).

(1985)

of the Brown

cited by Knapp and Kadzis

suggests that "Rhode Island is not doing well because

of Rhode Island.

but because of the run-off from Boston".

Steady jobs are increasingly found in the lower paid service
sector and are more dependent than ever on the commercial
success of corporations headquartered outside the state.
In the editorial section of the latest New
EC£Q£~X

~QZ1~Q~

(1986). James Howell of the Bank of Boston notes.

"The New England economy is like a West Texas rattlesnake.
To survive it has to shed its skin."
more applicable than in Providence.

2.3

Nowhere is his warning
Rhode Island.

A portrait of Providence
At the economic.

political and cultural hub of Rhode

Island is its capital city.
some 156.804 individuals

Providence.

This urban center of

(U.S. Bureau of the Census.

1980) is

located at the head of Narragansett Bay on the Providence
River.

43 miles south of Boston and 175 miles northeast of

New York.

On its borders are the cities of Pawtucket.

Cranston and East Providence.
North Providence.

18

and the towns of Johnston and

\
I

,...

I

Glocester

I

Johnston

... ,. ..
,

I

West Greenwich
~
0I t

I

I

2I

•I

·~
I

•

0

.......
Tiverton
M

West pc

_______..,
Ri~ond

M

Little Compton

_.. . _.;.,.___.._. . . ._I-~--\-

\

MAP 2.2
THE PROVIDENCE-WARWICK-PAWTUCKET S.M.S.A.

At the heart of the Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

(Map 2.2).

Providence

is theoretically more accessible to Rhode Island residents
than at any previous time

(Map 2.3).

Travel times from

peripheral areas to the city have been reduced by up to half
an hour (State Department of Transportation figures).
However.

the upgraded road network has proved to be a double-

edged sword; no longer is it necessary to go to Providence.
The north-south corridor which incorporates Routes I-295.
95.

I-

1. 2 and 4 have permitted otner metropolitan and suburban

communities to grow at unprecedented rates since the mid1970s.

Freed from the legacy of obsolete infrastructures.

perceived congestion and abandoned industrial buildings of which predominate in Providence's core areas -

all

communities

with room to grow have deposed the capital city's role as a
regional service center.
more recently.

Warwick.

Cranston.

Pawtucket and.

East Greenwich and North Kingstown have become

major suppliers of goods and services.

- A pattern of residential relocation
Concomitantly.
occurred.
region.

a southwards population shift has

As migrants have decanted from the state's core

they have settled in urban and suburban communities

along major state and interstate routes
et al.

1985).

(Marcia Marker Feld

Table 2.1 shows selected social/demographic

indicators demonstrating the effects of out-migration on the
city.

Total population fell by 12.5 percent from 179.213 in

1970 to 156.804 in 1980

(U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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1970.

AUTO TIAVU

Tl MI

- - - ttss
---191Z

JO Minutes Fro•

..

Providt'nce

•

MAP 2.3
TRAVEL TIMES TO PROVIDENCE
·.

21

TABLE 2. 1
SOCIAL AND DE"06RAPHIC INDICATOkS
CITY OF PROVIDENCE
1970. 1980
1970

1980

rota I Population
179213
Hed1an Aoe
32.1
I o5 vears +
26300
I < 18 vears
48745
I Households
62984
I Black Households
3587
I HousinQ Units
b8133
Persons / ~ousehold
2.69
I Professionals
10677
I Clerical
13976
I Crafts1en
8908
I Operatives
15990

1511804
29.9
24057
36419
1>0157
4200
b7535
2.44
8707
11316
7834
10851

Source:

l CHANGE

1970-80
-12.5
-b.9
-8.5
-25.3
-4.5
17.1
-1), 9
-9.3
-18.5
-19.0
-12.1
-32.1

U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1970, 1980
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1980).

Corresponding declines were witnessed in figures for

the total number of households
period)

(62,984 to 60,157

in the same

and the number of both young and elderly citizens

(26,300 to 24,057

in the over 65 year cohort,

36,419 in the under 18 year cohort).

and 48,745 to

The statewide figures

for this cohort show an increase in population,
in 1970 to 372,672 in 1980,

from 317,728

constituting a 17.3 percent

increase.
When compared to the picture of residential growth in
the surrounding communities of Warwick and Cranston,
Providence appears to be losing more ground in the period
since the last census was taken.

Figures for residential

building permits granted in the period 1980 to 1984
demonstrate the continuing decline in neighborhood
development in the state capital, with significant growth
concentrated in Warwick and Cranston (Figure 2.1).

When

Providence's residential growth is viewed cumulatively as a
share of development in the three communities,
18 percent of the total

(Figure 2.2).

Cranston have grown more impressively,
percent.

respectively

Development.

1986).

it takes only

Both Warwick and
40 percent and 42

(State Department of Economic
Table 2.2

c~nfirms

significant growth in

the periphery of the metropolitan region and only marginal
growth in the core, while Table 2.3 indicates a net negative
impact on the value of property in the capital

(median

property value of $38,000) when compared to values in Warwick
and Cranston with median values of $40.700 and $45,500,
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TABLE . .2. 2
RESIDENTIAL

BUILDl~6

PERllITS, 1980 - 1984
INCREASE

CITY
Providenci!
Cr ans ton
~ari4ick

Source:

1980

1981

1982

193
151
19b

m

bb

~j3

1983

11
!Ob

311

1984 srncE t 980

197

lb

SSS

~,,

423
203

1340
1272

" ~-

45b

EHSTIN6
UNITS 1980

TOT~L

b7535
27280
32450

Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics, 1985

TABLE 2.3
GENERAL HOUSING INDICATORS, 1980
City

1 Renter

Occupied
Providence
Cranston
Marwick

Source:

63.1
32.3
25.0

I 011ner
Occupied

36.9
67.7
75.0

lledian
Rent

lledian
Value

U39

$38000
$45500
$40700

$186
$228

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980
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I INCREASE

SIHCE 1980
0.9I
S.OI
4.0I

respectively

(U.S. Bureau of the Census,

1980).

The industrial and commercial experiences
Figure 2.3 indicates that, while Providence is once more
managing to recapture a sizeable share of regional
manufacturing opportunity,
been far from outstanding.

its performance since 1980 has
Table 2.4 indicates that the city

has experienced only approximately one half of the growth in
manufacturing space witnessed by Cranston (211,000 square
feet of new space in Providence versus 419,000 square feet in
Cranston).

If these figures are set in the context of total

statewide manufacturing construction,

Providence has captured

only 6.07 percent of all new space, while Cranston has
attracted 12.05 percent and Warwick 10.09 percent.
summary table of social/demographic indicators

The

(Table 2.1)

is

further evidence of the city's inability to foster industrial
growth.

The labor market for Providence residents no longer

supports a strong blue collar manufacturing workforce:

the

number of employees who found jobs in the Machine Operators
and Assemblers census category fell from 15,990 in 1970 to
10,851 in 1980, while in the Precision Production and Crafts
census category jobs declined from 8,908 to 7,834 in the same
period (U.S. Bureau of the Census,

1980).

The development of new commercial space within the
SMSA indicates that Providence is attracting retail
development at a rate which might be expected of a state
capital

(Table 2.5).

Its 21.16 percent share of new

commercial development statewide since 1980 would suggest a
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TABLE 2.4

NEM "ANUFACTURING CONSTRUCTION, 1980-1983
lOOO 's of Square Feet of Floor Space by Year

crn
Providence
Cranston
Wmcick

1980

1981

1902

21
184

4b
104
Sb

35

110

Source:

INCREASE I OF STATE INCREASE
1183 1930-1983
1980-1983 (347S)
109
70

211

bl

bl

as

351

419

b.07
12.05
[I). 09

Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics,
19 85
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TABLE 2. 5
NEW CQMMERCIAL CONSTRUCTION, 1990-1984
Square Feet by Year

CITY
Providence
Cranston
~arwick

1980

1981

1982

1983

59446
53699
182852

165165
185525
124890

681526
70725
101163

350000
137899
354858

Source:

. INCREASE %OF STATE INCREASE
1984 1980-1984 1980-1984 (71169421
250000
104134
378631

1506137
551982
142394

Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics,
1985
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21.16
7.76

16.05

sustained,

healthy retail sector.

But this is not the case.

Table 2.6 clearly demonstrates that Warwick. with 15.9
percent of total state retail sales has surpassed Providence.
with 14.4 percent.

Indeed,

a recent market analysis of

Providence's commercial core found that supermarkets and
department stores have been supplanted by low order
convenience shops and fancy goods establishments.

Further,

the majority of retail trade is conducted between the hours
of noon and 2:00 PM by downtown office workers
and Levine,

1986).

commercial sector.

(Carr, Lynch

So where has the real growth in the
indicated by the figures in Table 2.5.

taken place?
Perhaps the only sector of the citywide economy which
has experienced significant growth in recent years

(and,

incidentally,

is the

served to hold up the local economy)

service sector (Smolski.

1986).

Table 2.7 shows the

proportion of statewide service industry receipts taken by
Rhode Island's three largest cities.

Clearly,

Providence.

with 35.2 percent of the state total and $466,170,000 in
receipts
1986),

(Rhode Island Department of Economic

Development~

has captured the largest share of the service.

information.

technological, banking,

finance,

and consulting industries within the state.
of state government.

state agencies.

insurance,
The headquarters

regional banks and

industries choose Providence because of its central location.
its provision of communications technology.

its

infrastructure and the presence of complementary service
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TABLE 2.6
RANK BY VOLUME OF RETAIL SALES, 1982
City

State Rank

Saies ($1000)

I of Total State
Sales

Pro'l i d~nce

2

S599787

Cr ans ton

.)

S29'1146

14. ~
7.1'1

S662964

15. 't

~arw i ck

Source:

Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics,
1985

TABLE 2. 7
RANK BY VOLUME OF SERVICE INDUSTRYRECEIPTS, 1982
City

State Rank

Providence
Cranston
WarMick

Source:

I
4
2

Receipt lSI OOOl
$466170
SB7034
$149061

% of

State
Receipts

35.2
6.44

11.03

Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics,
1985
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uses.

In this sense.

Providence is truly a state capital and

regional service center.

But its overdependence on one

industrial sector and its perceived low desirability as a
residential location and as an environment for sound clientoriented.

face-to-face trade have been barriers to balanced

economic development

(Arthur Markos.

interview. August.

1986).
-

An unpredictable fiscal future
Table 2.8 summarizes the fiscal experience of the City

of Providence during the period 1980 to 1985.

In a recent

seminar given as part of The University of Rhode Island's
'Professional Guest Lecturer Series'
program (October 8.

in the graduate planning

1986). Mr. Arthur Markos.

Director of the City of Providence.

noted some drastic trends

in the budget planning of the municipality.
years 1980 to 1987.

Planning

In the fiscal

the nationwide federal cuts in urban

revenue sharing programs amount to a decline of 71 percent.
Of slated social spending cuts in the federal budget for this
period. which amount to some $10.000.000.000.
will account for some $7.soo.ooo.ooo.

urban programs

Proposed for either

elimination or phased reduction are Urban Development Action
Grants.

Small Business Administration loans.

r e habilitation programs.

housing

economic development schemes.

most significantly for Providence.

and.

Community Development

Block Grants.
Substantial increases in UDAG and CDBG monies made
available through programs established in the mid- and late-
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TABLE 2. 8
FISCAL TRENDS! CITY OF PROVIDENCE.
1980

1981

1982

1980-198~

1983

1984

1985

Total Revenues
115,680,751 117,545,120 140, 051. 906 152.508,215 153,726,454 160,482,075
Propertv Tax
12; 40L 530 12;326,656 e1;514 ;e96 90,303;204 92. 794; 781 96;489;782
39.6
38.8
42.0
41.4
40.0
i: Residential
42.3
t Co11ercial
29.3
30.1
31.1
31.2
32.5
32.6
% lndustri al
9.1
7.7
7.5
8.6
9.8
8.3
% Other
19.2
21.1
20.4
20.0
18.8
18.6
22,987,193 24,196,290 30,804,180 35,781,729 44,875,327 47,769,449
State Aid
· 947;000
1;235,000
State School Aid
795;000
L525;ooo
1,675,000
1;012;000
113,077
148,870
5;115,106
5,269,753
Federal Aid
440,991
5;23o;n2
· 65;ooo
. 32;000
Fed. School Aid
36,000
68,000
47;000
61 ;000

Source:

Rhode Island Department of Community Affairs,
1980-1985
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1970s began to decline from a high point of federal

revenue

sharing in 1983. when Providence received $5.715.106 in
direct federal aid

(Table 2.8).

The City Administration

anticipates gradual decreases in federal monies for the
immediate future.

Revaluation of properties for the purpose

of the property tax levy is currently in the research phase.
but neither this nor incremental increases in state aid will
buffer the anticipated loss in federal cuts
guest lecturer.

(Arthur Markos.

The University of Rhode Island.

1986).

Mayors have been consistently reluctant to increase local
taxes;

local terms of office are for four years and such

increases would not be 'psychologically'

absorbed by the

electorate before the next elections.
The single largest subsidy preferred by the City is in
the area of public education.

Table 2.8 clearly demonstrates

the shift in external assistance.
contracted in this decade.

As federal aid has

so the state has been forced to

intervene with significant annual increases in fiscal
support.
Indeed.

from $785.000 in 1980 to $1.675.000 in 1985.
it was limited fiscal resources -

self-perpetuating urban problems -

in the face of

that brought back into

the spotlight the pressing issues associated with downtown
Providence.

2.4

The ripeness of a specifically 'downtown' plan
It was doubts about the availability of funds for

innovative future planning.

not only in education but across

33

the broad spectrum of public sector policy making.
brought the focus of Mayor Joseph R.

Paolino.

Jr.

that
and the

senior staff at the Department of Planning and Development to
bear upon the issue of breathing new life into downtown
Providence.

Acutely aware of the social.

trends outlined in this chapter.

economic and fiscal

the Administration realized

that the city core was not recovering from years of decline
and recession in the manner of Cranston. Warwick and other
Rhode Island central places.
continuing decline.

Fears about the implications of

coupled with an awareness of the

potential benefits to be derived from tapping the positive
residual effects of the booming Boston regional economy.

led

to a fresh perspective on the value of downtown as a catalyst
for change.

Already.

by 1985.

Capital Center Project.

there were plans for the

a public-private partnership of

unprecedented scale geared toward revitalizing 60 acres in
the State Capitol Building area of downtown.

Likewise.

the

Plan for the Providence Waterfront was in the early stages of
implementation. based upon the designs of William Warner.
consulting architect.
historic core.

But what of the old downtown.

the financial and retail district?

the

the

Prevailing

conditions both in terms of the physical fabric and the
delicate economic position demanded closer attention.
As the consultants who were selected to conduct the
study for downtown were quick to point out.

missing the boat

this time might destroy the chances of recovery forever.
Chester Smolski.

Director of Urban Studies at Rhode Island
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College wrote in a recent article (1986),

of the time being

"right" for a fresh approach to downtown planning.

Paolino

himself caught the tide of renewed optimism for the center of
the city when he delivered his Second Annual State of the
City Address

(January,

1986):

"There is a new and exciting

feeling when you mention Providence.

It is a feeling that

comes from the changes we have made and from experiencing the
sheer beauty and magnificence of a city coming back to life."
Later in his speech,
in:

"Still,

a note of realism and caution set

there is much work to be done before our downtown

truly becomes a centerpiece for the neighborhoods •.. "
then,

Here,

is the context for a fresh analysis of the plight of

downtown Providence.

Paolino,

ever careful not to

overemphasize the central city for fear of offending the
neighborhoods

(in which the voters dwell),

but all the while

conscious of his vested realty interests in the urban core
(the Paolino family owns and manages substantial commercial
holdings in the historic core district),

acknowledged that

public policy would once more dwell seriously on downtown:

"A

comprehensive downtown strategy will be completed this year.
I am asking the Director of Planning and Development to make
recommendations based on that strategy and report them to me

. •••
by spring

"

As things transpired,
environment changedi

however,

the planning and policy

the re-emphasis of downtown in city

planning was to be held back until after the elections.
Influential members of the Greater Providence Chamber of
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Commerce advised Paolino privately not to push the plan too
hard before the November.
period.

1986 elections.

May through October.

But in the interim

an orchestrated campaign of

further research and analysis.

public consultation.

policy

generation and strategy modification was conducted.

Under

the aegis of Department Director. Arthur Markos.

a team of

city staffers and downtown professionals from both public and
private sectors began to hammer out the form and substance of
future planning -

its substance.

funding and management -

in downtown Providence.

2.5

A portrait of downtown
An assessment of the picture of Providence's core which

presents itself to the planner in 1986.
positive and negative.

Visually.

shows elements both

downtown is a microcosm of

the intensive and diverse land uses of the archetypal
American central city.

During the daytime.

rub shoulders with high school gangs.

corporate bankers

At night.

a

cosmopolitan. but low profile. mix of theater goers and chic
restaurant patrons stroll nonchalantly past a more visible
hotchpotch of homosexual bar cliques.
drug addicts and drunks.

shabby street folk.

On one side of Dorrance Street.

a clearly delineated zone stretching to the river.

in

are the

skyscrapers in which the Fleet National and Rhode Island
Hospital Trust banks are located.

On the other.

encqmpassing

the blocks up to Empire Street.

are shabby stores.

underutilized office buildings.

bars.
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tabacconists and dingy

drug stores.

Depending on the extent of his idealism.

planner's dream -

or his nightmare.

mill or sense of purpose.
not always this way.

a

And adding grist to his

is the knowledge that things were

and need not pe so today.

Armed with

their batch of descriptive statistics could not the city
planners find an appropriate strategy for change?

Clearly.

the Mayor and his planning director thought that they could.
For the moment.

though.

the descriptive statistics.

- The changing profile of downtown residents
Table 2.9 presents a summary of demographic and
employment indicators for census tract 08.
Providence (U.S. Bureau of the Census.
areal delineation of downtown.
analysis.

Downtown

1970.

1980).

The

for the purposes of this

corresponds to census tract 08 as defined by

Map 2.4.
While the total population of Providence has declined
over the past decade.

downtown has experienced a 32 percent

increase from 1.560 individuals in 1970 to 2.045 in 1980.
Concomitantly.

a 38 percent increase in the number of housing

units was witnessed in the same period (from 885 to 1.223).
as was an increase in dwelling density which rose from 2.86
units per acre in 1970 to 3.96 units per acre in 1980.

Much

of this increase is attributable to two large scale tower
block developments aimed at the elderly.

The pre-existing

housing stock is occupied by a broad cross-section of
Providence citizens.

but a notable change in the demographic

composition h as occurred since 1970.
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The number of

TABLE 2.9

SOCJHL HNO OEHOGRMPHIC INDICATORS
DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE
1970, 1980
1970

fatal Population
Population/Acre
I Housinq Uni ts
t Uni ts i Acre
t White Households
t Black Households
t Hale !Harried!
I Hale !Sinolel
t Fe1ale !Harried)
I Feaale !Sinolel
I in HiQh School
t Lived in Sate
House for 5 vrs
%Hale Une1ploved
I Fe1. Une1ploved
t Professionals
I in Hanufacturing
I in F. I.R.E.
I Fa1ilies
< Pov er tv Leve 1

Source:

1980

t CHHN6E

1970-80

lSoO
5.05
885
2.86
1449
84
265
332
236
231
8

1223
3.96
1803
162
201
471
187
481
5

32.0
31. l
38.2
38.5
24.4
92. 9
-24.2
41. 9
-20.8
108.2
-37.5

506
1. 5
2.6
113
130
30

746
8
9.3
198
134
148

47.4
433.3
257.7
75.2
3.1
393.3

12.S

2.8

-77.6

2045
b.b2

U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1970, 1980
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MAP 2.4
PROVIDENCE, CENSUS TRACTS

)

' \.----

Source:

___ ]

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970, 1980
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professional job-holders increased by 98 percent.
1980.

1970 to

The number of manufacturing employees increased by

only 3.1 percent.

Those employed in the Finance.

Insurance

and Real Estate census category increased by 393 pe r cent
(Table 2.9).
Clearly.

there has been a shift toward those individuals

employed in the burg eo ning downtown service industries and.
conversely.

an expected decline in those inner city residents

who once found work in the city's manufacturing sector.

This

hypothesis is reinforced by Melvin Levine's market analysis
for upmarket residential dwellings conducted in the Downtown
Development Strategy (discussed in Chapter 4).
professional singles and couples.
appearing on the downtown scene.

the 'Yuppies'.

Young
are

taking apartments on the

lower East Side and attics in the historic core.

The local economy and the pattern of land use
Steve Carr.

one of the consultants who presented the

Downtown Strategy before a public forum at City Hall in July.
1986.

opened his talk with the words.

"Downtown Providence

today appears to be in a state of suspended animation.
between decline and renewal ••• "

His words aptly summarize

the state of flux evidenced by the downtown economy.
existing office.

Plan)

The

retail and housing sectors are all lagging

behind their full potential.
South Main Street

just

But. while Corliss Landing and

(encompassed by the Waterfront District

and the area between the old railroad tracks and the

State Capitol Building (overseen by the Capital Center
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Commission)

already have detailed plans for revitalization

and economic development,

the historic core -

where the bulk

of existing downtown offices and shops are located received little attention.
area

(Map 2.5),

consultants,

has

Within a clearly defined study

agreed upon by the City and its special

these negative economic trends appear to be most

acute and demanding of unique policy solutions.
What remains of Providence's historic downtown core may,
however,

prove to be fundamental to growth.

Providence,

like Boston,

Indeed

is fortunate that its core area did

not witness the blasphemous wholesale clearance in the 1960s
and 1970s when the value of older buildings was not fully
appreciated.

The current legacy of fine Victorian buildings

is an asset to attempts to promote downtown location of a
variety of commercial uses.
While the buildings have largely been retained,

the

activities which once inhabited them have gone through a
period of sharp decline,
by gradual resurgence.

only recently to have been countered
As retail businesses moved to

suburban and fringe metropolitan locations,
and Warwick,

downtown began to empty out and to lose its

identity as the single
Island urban region.
resurgence,

such as Cranston

'multi-purpose'

center of the Rhode

To the extent that there has been

it has been concentrated in those segments of the

service sector which command a broad sphere of influence and
Business,

a regionally based market.

government agencies predominate.

41

high order services and

MAP 2.5
THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STUDY AREA
42

New highrise office structures have changed the old
skyline around Kennedy Plaza.

Empire Street and Lasalle

Square provide recent contributions to the inventory of Class
'A'

Office Space

(office spaces commanding a per square foot

rent in excess of $15.00).

This is.

however.

relatively

little development for a city the size of Providence. while
residual development appears to be taking place primarily by
upgrading from within via rehabilitation projects.
market.

therefore.

The

appears still to be somewhat slack;

a number of the attractive spaces in the Fleet.

even

Old Stone and

Hospital Trust buildings remain vacant.
This slow rate of current development can be attributed.
for the most part.

to dynamic growth in the more desirable

locations of Boston.
York.

Hartford.

Stanford and suburban New

The nearby Boston metropolitan area. with its

established commercial ribbon developments along Routes
128 and 495.

has probably constituted a severe constraint to

growth in Providence.

The key to a new downtown planning

strategy is to tap into Boston's good fortune and to reap the
unquestionable advantages Providence has to offer.
particularly in respect to rents.
grade level public education.

congestion.

accessibility.

open · space and all round

livability.

Downtown districts
For the purposes of inventorying development opportunity
sites.

geared to ameliorating the unyielding economic

climate.

downtown can be subdivided into a number of
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districts,

each with its own characteristics and problems.

Map 2.6 shows the following subsections of downtown:
Plaza -

in the northeast corner of the area,

Kennedy

the plaza was

recently reconstructed as the central terminal for Rhode
Island Public Transportation Authority's bus operation;
Financial District -

the

a striking collection of older off ice

buildings in the center of which is located the struggling
Arcade retail complex;

the Providence Waterfront -

the newly designated Waterfront District,
and the RISD area;

including

South Main Street

the Courthouse District -

an area of

marginal uses including parking garages and warehouses;
Weybosset Hill -

containing evidence of recent renewal and

the fire-gutted Outlet Building;

the Retail District -

bordered by Washington, Westminster and Weybosset Streets,
containing an uneasy mix of abandoned lots cleared for
parking, Westminster Mall,
office structures;

drug stores,

bars and run-down

the Capital Center Project Area -

of prime development land;

the Jewelry District -

60 acres

a blend of

four- to six-story brick manufacturing buildings and
dilapidated offices; and,

finally,

Davol Square -

the large

scale private retail and office development yet to find a
wholly adequate slot in the regional marketplace.
Naturally.

the pattern of decline has had different

impacts on each of these areas.
primarily on the historic core
Fountain and Weybosset).

While concentrating
(bounded by Dorrance. Empire,

the consultants were asked by the

City to look to the issues affecting the wider downtown
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environment.

Whether or not they proceeded to do so is the

subject of Chapter 4.

Whether or not what they selected to

study was convincingly thorough is the subject of Chapter 5.

2.6

Evidence enough to demand a new strategy
With the benefits of intimacy conferred by local

professional knowledge.

the senior planning staff in

Paolina's Administration were quite aware of the areal
disparities across the city and increasingly aware of the
district-to-district disparities which existed within
downtown itself.

Persuading the Mayor to adopt an active

stance toward economic development was not a difficult task.
The hiring of appropriate consultants and the setting of
goals were different matters altogether.

***
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CHAPTER 3
PLAN OF ATTACK:

THE CONSULTANTS

AND THEIR METHODOLOGY
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"We have to make a fundamental decision.
what is it we actually want to achieve?

First.
We have

to make sure that we know what our objective is
and that we then select the means that are
appropriate to that objective."
Henry Kissinger.
Former U.S.

Secretary of State.
on Nicaragua.
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1984

3.1

The need for consultants and a fresh approach
The most cursory review of plans for downtown Providence

since the early 1960s reveals a sad trend in local city
planning.

While.

in every case.

the presentation of

contemporary social and economic environments is
unquestionably thorough.

only the vaguest hints at policy

recommendations and methods of implementation are ventured.
At present.
Hall.

under the experienced eye of Ms.

Charlene

former aide to Mayor Vincent Cianci and current

Executive Director of the Capital Center Commission.

the much

publicized Capital Center Project is overseeing the removal
of obsolete AMTRAK lines and the installation of a new urban
infrastructure.

This section of downtown. with its admirably

comprehensive design review regulations.
care of in terms of coordinated planning.

is already taken
Likewise.

those

areas on the immediate waterfront are incorporated into a new
Waterfront District with designs already submitted and
approved along the lines proposed by chief consulting
architect.

Mr. William Warner.

For the reasons detailed in the previous chapter. both
the oversights of the past and the ripeness of the current
regional economic situation.

begged a focus upon the long

suffering historic core districts.

An immediate decision was

made by the Administration not to undertake the task of
undertaking a development strategy 'in house'.

The city's

Director of Planning and Development is always first to
acknowledge the lack of planning expertise among his regular
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staff.

The only qualified urban planner in the Department,

Ms. Kathleen Field,

finds herself occupied with the routine

of day-to-day planning matters.

Her commitment to long range

planning is currently limited to updating land use maps and
ordinance changes for neighborhood zoning,

in association

with her assistant Soo Dip Chin.
Given the lack of technical ability in the pool of
department staff, yet armed with well defined concepts with
regard to the policy direction of the proposed strategy,
Mayor Paolino and Arthur Markos decided to recruit the
assistance of well qualified,

highly experienced consultants.

With a proposed budget in excess of $75,000 the
Administration believed that soundly researched proposals
would be forthcoming within a politically acceptable time
frame.
The selection of Carr, Lynch Associates in conjunction
with Melvin Levine and Associates was based upon their
satisfaction of a number of key criteria.

First,

the

background of Steve Carr in downtown urban design projects
and the professional market analysis work of Melvin Levine in
association with the Rouse Corporation,

commended their

collaboration in a study for Providence which would demand
the skills of both designer and economist.

Second,

the

objectivity of a firm with no prior professional knowledge of
the circumstances of downtown would ensure recommendations
free from political contamination.
were acutely aware of the city's,
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All concerned parties
albeit unjust,

reputation

for nepotism and bias in its exercise of policy
implementation.

Third,

the small size of both Carr's and

Levine's firms ensured the personal involvement of the
characters interviewed.

While research assistants would be

employed in the gathering of data,

plan and policy derivation

would be handled by the key professionals hired.

Subsequent

relations between the Administration and the consulting
consortium would be limited to meetings between the Mayor,
his planning department Director,

senior department staff,

Steve Carr and Melvin Levine.

3.2

Broad brush strokes:

what did the City want?

Given the existing conditions of downtown and the areal
disparities within the core noted in Chapter 2 of this
Research Project,

the natural concentration of effort was

envisaged to fall upon the historic core
2. 6) •

(as defined by Map

The Administration drew the consultants'

attention to

the following issues and concerns:
1.

The vacancy rates existing in both Class
'B'

2.

and Class

spaces.

Trends among development interests leading to proposed
high quality,

3.

'A'

condominium type residential units.

Poor physical infrastructure and streetscapes in the
retail district.

4.

The limited demand for rehabilitated properties.

5.

The inadequacy of downtown as a citywide retail center.

6.

Westminster Mall's poor visibility to shoppers.
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7.

The absence of coordinated marketing and management
for the downtown area.

8.

Traffic congestion,

parking problems and the layout of

the existing ring road system.
9.

Physical linkages and accessibility between Capital
Center,

the Waterfront District,

the Court House

District and Davol Square.
10.

The absence of downtown attractions and facilities for
potential evening and weekend visitors or tourists.
A broad summary of goals was furnished to support the

Carr-Lynch-Levine research.
seen as paramount.

Economic development issues were

Second, were the management and marketing

of downtown as a unique neighborhood in which to live and
conduct business.

Third, were the desirable objectives of

improved urban design and upgraded physical fabric.

3.3

Study parameters set by the consultants
As described,

common ground was found between the

Administration and Carr-Lynch-Levine in establishing a mapped
study area

(Map.

2.6).

Briefly.

this area focuses on those

blocks between Empire and Dorrance,

Fountain and Pine Streets

-

since that was the area

essentially the old retail core -

identified as being in greatest need of attention.

For the

purposes of integrating surrounding areas into long term
goals.

the study team also considered the districts

associated with Capital Center. Kennedy Plaza, Union Station.
Dyer Street

(the waterfront)
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and the Jewelry District.

The consultants proceeded to establish a statement of
purpose.

a series of goals and a methodology of data

collection tailored to the downtown study.
The overall purpose of the Development Strategy
was to make Providence "a better place in which to work.
do business.

1986).

to live and enjoy life"

to

(Carr-Lynch-Levine.

Commensurate with the wishes of the Administration.

the statement of purpose in the strategy was refined to
achieve the following by the year 2000:
1.

Attract new office growth first to locations within the
historic core.

to provide direct support for residential

and retail development.
2.

Develop a downtown residential community large enough
to create a positive evening and weekend presence on
the streets.

as well as an active group to advocate

continued improvement.
3.

Restore downtown retail to its full potential based on
office workers,

and create a realistic increase in

evening and weekend business based on city and suburban
residents and visitors.
4.

Create a set of new attractions,
already in downtown,

complementing those

in order · to increase evening and

weekend activity.
5.

Create a management function capable of promoting the
continued growth and well-being of the area.

6.

Revive the Westminster Mall as the central spine of
downtown activity and as a street of pride for the
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people of Providence.
7.

Facilitate the re-creation of a mixed use downtown
waterfront between Dyer Street and the Providence River.

8.

Improve and reinforce the downtown ring roads for
parking access,

and provide publicly assisted structured

parking adequate to support the projected hous i ng and
office growth.
The three broad goals specified for the downtown
development effort were:
1.

To stimulate the development and occupancy of office
space to accommodate the growth of existing firms and
the needs of new firms attracted to Providence.

2.

To encourage the development of housing in rehabilitated
structures, where appropriate,

to accommodate the strong

latent demand for housing in the downtown area.
3.

To encourage the expansion and sound merchandising of
the retail/restaurant/service space in the downtown
retail district and financial district to accommodate
increases in downtown shopping by area residents
attracted by celebrations,

events and festivals

arranged around a network of attractions.

3.4

The consultants' methodology
Most of the consultants'

recommendations were based upon

a commendably thorough data base inventory pertaining to a
carefully selected zone within the study area:
Development District

(Map 3.1).

54

the Downtown

Data was also collected,

MAP 3.1
DOWNTOWN PLANNING DISTRICTS
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though less comprehensively.
study area

(Map 3.1).

for Fringe Districts within the

Recommendations in the Carr-Lynch-

Levine Development Strategy apply most directly.

therefore.

to the Downtown Development District.
The collection of primary and secondary data for
assembly in the published data base was conducted in two
ways:

first.

a review of secondary social.

and economic data.
and policy plans;

demographic.

as well as an analysis of past land use
second.

collection exercises -

the execution of two primary data

a downtown land use inventory and a

market analysis which included a downtown employee survey.
A descriptive analysis of the consultants'
presented in the following chapter.
the report are made in Chapter 5.

***
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findings is

A review and critique of

CHAPTER 4
PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING DECLINE:
A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF
THE CARR-LYNCH-LEVINE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
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"The key components of the strategy will be
financial and institutional inventions.
superstructure for a vital,
downtown is mostly there.

The

successful
With aggressive

management it can be filled with renewed
activity."
Carr-Lynch-Levine,

1986

"My vision of a new residential neighborhood
in the heart of downtown can be a reality"
Mayor Joseph R.
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Paolino, Jr ••

1986

4.1

Structure of the report
Consisting of 161 pages.

Q~vel~E~~E! ~!E~!~~y

appendices.

~--------

--------

is divided into eight chapters and three

Following the logical succession of planning

research methodology.
conditions and then.

an assessment is given of existing
after a summary of the proposed 'Overall

Development Strategy'.
retail development.
strategy.

the Providence Downtown

recommendations are submitted for

housing development and an attractions

The final chapter gives a future scenario of 'The

Future Downtown'.

detailing the expected physical.

economic outcomes of the policy recommendations.

social and
The

appendices summarize the methodology and results of the
market analysis and employment survey.

as well as provide

acknowledgements to study participants and advisors.

4.2

Major elements of the Development Strategy
Before analyzing implementational aspects of the

Strategy in respect to planning.

funding and management.

the

elements of the Carr-Lynch-Levine report. by functional area.
are briefly summarized.

Page numbers in this and the

following chapter - are cited to correspond with the Strategy
as presented to the City of Providence in March.
the better orientation of the reader.

1986.

For

the consultants'

graphics for existing and proposed land uses in the historic
core are furnished

(Maps 4.1 and 4.2).

Retail development
The historic core contains 238.000 square feet of
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shoppers'

goods stores

miscellaneous retail).

(including apparel,

as well as 210,000 square feet of

convenience stores and services
drinking places).

furniture and

(including eating and

The shoppers'

goods stores are focussed on

Westminster and Weybosset Streets, between Dorrance and
Mathewson.

Most of the full service restaurants are located

on or within a block of Washington Street,
and Mathewson.

between Dorrance

The consultants found that shoppers'

goods

stores and the restaurants combined derive 70 to 80 percent
of their sales from downtown employees
Appendix 1,

(Market Analysis,

p.133).

There are no department stores remaining in the downtown
area.

Department stores typically attract about half of all

dollars expended in downtown retail establishments
Levine,

1986).

(Melvin

The addition of a department store or a

collection of associated stores in a department store-like
development

(similar to that proposed for the recently fire

damaged Outlet Building), was seen by the consultants as
constituting a "quantum-step increase in expenditures by
downtown employees and in shopping trips to downtown by city
and suburban residents."
The retail development strategy calls for the type of
management to be found in suburban shopping malls.
upon t

Based

e land use inventory and the employee survey,

essential components for retail success were established as:
1.

An upscale department store.

2.

More apparel stores.

3.

An attractive.

secure and well-maintained Westminster

Mall.
4.

Improved parking.

5.

More attractions downtown on weekends for area residents
and visitors.
The tasks of the agency to be charged with executing the

Strategy.

in respect to retail growth.

can be summarized as

follows:
1.

Work with owners of vacant stores and of stores at key
locations to bring in first class apparel and specialty
stores with a view to strengthening retail links
between the Arcade and Dorrance Street and along both
Westminster and Weybosset Streets.

2.

Direct the conversion of Westminster Mall to a festival
place with improved pavement.

lighting.

signs.

awnings.

and exhibit/performing places.
3.

Work with restaurant owners along Washington Street to
make their operations more inviting to patrons.

4.

Work with retail.

restaurant and entertainment facility

managers to create a parking validation system that
essentially would offer free parking to clients in
the evenings and at weekends.
5.

Work with retail store managers and property owners to
create an operations manual for the Downtown Retail
District.

Create and seek the adoption of a model

retail lease for future retail tenants that would embody
the provisions of the operations manual.
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Housing development
A strong residential neighborhood in the downtown area

would provide a strong sense of
continuous presence of people.

'community'

and the

around the clock. would make

the center of Providence come alive at weekends.
more importantly.

Perhaps

there would be a lobby for safety.

cleanliness and amenities.
The projects identified by the Strategy. which add up to
over 1.800 units.

are geared to middle and upper-middle

income individuals and families and are identified as
potentials for six sites in the Planning Area as follows:
1.

The Retail Core -

The rehabilitation of the Shepard's

Building (170 units).
Westminster East

the Outlet Company

(130 units)

(320 units).

and Westminster West

(50 units).
2.

Weybosset Hill -

The rehabilitation of the Caesar Misch

Building and surrounding area into a proposed 'Weybosset
Crescent Project'

(120 units)

for which a prototype

model is detailed (p.105).
3.

The Courthouse District -

The development of three

currently disused industrial structures in 'The Art
Factory'
4.

(150 units)

Kennedy Plaza -

for occupancy by city artists.

The construction of two housing towers

on Parcel 1 of the Capital Center Project
each tower).

as well as the conversion of the old Union

Station into luxury condominiums
5.

(80 units in

Waterfront District -

(160 units).

The construction of luxury
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condominiums with views to the new Waterfront Park
(160 units).
6.

Capital Center -

The construction of high income

townhouses or garden apartments
7.

Jewelry District -

(40 units).

Over a period of ten years.

the

development of rental and owner-occupied residences
(500 units)

in both new construction and rehabilitation.

Attractions strategy
A major goal of the Downtown Development Strategy is the
reawakening of downtown Providence during the evenings and
weekends.

Key to this goal is attracting visitors.

residents

from Providence's neighborhoods and downtown workers.

Five

proposed attractions are ventured to complement existing
centers of activity.
The proposed attractions are of two kinds:
cultural.

first.

entertainment and educational attractions housed in

buildings; second.

programs or events to be organized and

held at various locations.

including festivals.

concerts and outdoor performances.

fairs.

The five proposed

attractions are as follows:
1.

A revitalized retail/restaurant/entertainment district
that would include:
festival lighting;

an improved streetscape and new
streetscape and lighting improvements

on Washington Street and Union Street; and a new
Entertainment Center.
Mall
2.

linking Washington to Westminster

(including a restaurant and cinemas).

A theme exhibit.

such as an historic railroad engine.

65

along with performance facilities in Kennedy Plaza,
and demountable festival exhibit structures in the
Fleet Building Galleria.
3.

An appropriately themed stage setting and performance
facilities and equipment in Cathedral Square for
celebrations and festival events,

to be funded in

association with a local sponsor or sponsors.
4.

An Art Factory to be developed in association with
housing considerations which would consist of
exhibit and sales studios for artists,

sculptors and

craftspersons with interior and exterior space for
related entertainment activities.
5.

A theme exhibit,

such as an historic coastal steamer,

tied to an appropriately designed restaurant/retail
attraction on the waterfront,

also to be undertaken

with assistance from sponsors.
The locations of existing and proposed attractions are
shown in Map 4.3.

The future downtown
The consultants anticipate that implementation of their
Strategy will result in a very different downtown by the year
2000.

Noting that we are now closer to the year 2000 than to

the year 1970 and that incredible changes have occurred in
Providence in the period 1960 to 1986,

Steve Carr (1986)

notes that his perspective on achievable change is a feasible
one.

If their recipe for growth is followed he firmly

believes that,

"The core will once again be the vibrant
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center of the city's economic and cultural life.

It will be

a pleasant and exciting place to live. work and play.
will once again be the pride of its citizens".

It

The

consultants expect to see the following in place by the turn
of the next century:
1.

Westminster Street will be revived as the active spine
of downtown:
brick street.

a simple.

elegant and colorful tree-lined

At midday and on many weekends it will be

filled with crowds of shoppers.

enjoying a renewed

retail district.
2.

The upper floors

throughout the old retail core will

once again be filled.

the predominant use being

residential rather than commercial.
workers.

students and the elderly will add immeasurably

to the quality of the street life.
safe.
3.

Downtown office

helping it to seem

clean and orderly.

Weybosset will continue to be a strong street and
become more so with the construction of Weybosset
Crescent and the filling of the upper floors with
housing.

The Outlet development will replace a present

major 'dead spot' with new life.

The Arcade office

development will provide continuity between the two
districts.
4.

retail and financial.

Washington Street will continue in its role as a support
street with bus traffic and parking structures. but it
will be softened by trees.
even greater numbers.

Restaurants will develop in

the new structures having windows
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and canopies adding color to the scene.
5.

A new ring of attractions will be in place,
the old core,

surrounding

each linked to new developments.

Next to

the existing Civic Center will be a Convention Center,
linked,

in turn,

to a new convention hotel and a 900

car parking garage.
6.

Kennedy Plaza will be the major focus for downtown
celebration,
summer,

hosting several fairs and festivals each

as well as a Winterfest.

add interest to the Plaza,

A train exhibit will

linked through specialty

retail to the waterfront and Capital Center.

The

Fleet Galleria will provide a setting for changing
exhibits and performances and will extend the weekend
festivals inside.
7.

River relocation will be complete and the city will have
a handsome new waterfront,
circulation in the core.

as well as improved
The Dyer/Eddy interchange with

I-195 will have been reconstructed to open the city's
old dock area to a mixed redevelopment of restaurants,
luxury housing,
8.

highrise offices and shops.

Another focal point will be the Art Factory at Pine and
Richmond Streets.

Here,

in converted factory buildings

will be a rich mix of artists'
and a restaurant.

studios,

exhibit spaces

This complex will build on the

presence of RISD's faculty and students and Providence's
rich tradition in the arts.
around giving a

'mini-Soho'
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Other housing will cluster
type atmosphere.

9.

The Jewelry District will take off as more and more
people seek to move back into the desirable downtown
area.

This area has the potential for creating several

thousand more housing units.

initially in converted

factories and then in townhouse development.
10.

Access and circulation will be much improved by the work
at the Dyer/Eddy interchange and on the ring road.
Modest improvements to other arterial streets.

such as

trees and sidewalk repaving. will attract commercial
activity.

built on increased vehicular and pedestrian

traffic.
The following section looks at how Carr-Lynch-Levine
hoped to bring about this idealistic. but desirable.

future

downtown.

4.3

Planning.

funding and management

Perhaps even more important than the substantive
elements of the Development Strategy are the recommendations
for its implementation.

The consultants paid as much

attention to planning techniques.

funding schemes and

strategy management as the actual physical and economic plans
themselves.

A number of innovative schemes were proposed as

vehicles for successful goal attainment.

Management:

The Providence Company

Section II of this thesis dwells at length upon the
implications of and alternatives for a new management agency
for downtown Providence.

The prototype proposed by Carr-
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Lynch-Levine is seen as the "principal energizing element of
the strategy".

For this reason.

the Department of Planning

and Development interpreted this key proposal as the most
significant and far-reaching of the Strategy's findings
(Arthur Markos.

interview. July.

1986).

According to the prototype model.

the Providence Company

would be a non-profit private entity that would provide
development packaging and management services for the
Downtown Planning Area.
planning department.

It would operate as an arm of the

providing services to and operating

programs in the Downtown Planning Area on a contract basis
with City agencies and private firms.
Policy direction would be provided by a Board of
Directors comprised of public officials.
persons.
Mayor.

downtown business

and private and civic leaders appointed by the
The Providence Company would employ a professional

staff to manage the several action strategies proposed in the
report.

It would receive financial support for its operating

expenses and programs from a Downtown Tax Increment District
to be set up by the Department of Planning and Development.
The Company would provide development coordination and
development packaging services directly by its professional
staff;

it would direct advertising and promotional campaigns;

it would supervise maintenance and security services

(on a

contract basis); and it would directly control expenses
associated with Westminster Mall.

In short.

it would be the

principal means of direct Strategy implementation.
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Public improvements
In addition to the plans for retail,
and attractions,

commercial,

several related improvements to the public

environment and downtown image are proposed
Substantial treatment is outlined for:
(Westminster Mall, Union Street,
ring road

housing

(p.51).

retail streets

and Washington Street);

the

(including the repair of Pine and Friendship

Streets, widening of sidewalks and a bolder, more visible
graphic identification of the ring road system); parking
structures (principally in terms of renovation,

expansion and

upgrading of existing garages); and the waterfront area
(following the improvements to the Dyer/Eddy interchange,

all

improvements concur with William Warner's Waterfront Plan).

Zoning and design review
According to the Strategy. modifications in downtown
zoning will also require action (p.55).
and Horowitz

(1984),

downtown zoning should encourage the

fine grain mix of off ices,
Strategy.

As suggested by Haar

housing and retail adopted by the

The consultants support the City's intention to

re-zone the entire downtown core as a C-3 Downtown Commercial
Zone

(a zone which would permit all uses in C-2.

as well as

those in R-4. with only use and not area controls) which
would promote mixed use and place no physical limitations on
downtown housing.
Parking and servicing requirements should also support
the increasing density of downtown.
lower parking space per square foot
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The Strategy proposes a
ratio for new

construction in conjunction with substantial financial
assistance to support future parking development.

Aware of

the somewhat conservative nature of the city's politics.

the

report does not recommend that any special incentive bonuses
or sophisticated provisions such as TDR (transferable
development rights)

or linkage schemes would be appropriate.

In respect to design review
matter).

(always a controversial

the Mayor is urged to establish a new entity.

separate from the proposed Providence Company. which would
review major development projects,

specifically those that

affect the historic character of downtown.

as well as those

exceeding specified magnitudes of development and those to be
built in prominent locations.

The Design Review Committee

would be composed of five to ten members and be
representative of each design profession (architecture.
landscape architecture.
engineering).

planning.

urban design and

the development community.

preservation interests.

the historic

and the Department of Planning and

Development.

Recommendations would be made to the Mayor and

to the D.P.D.

as to the approval.

further review.

modification.

need for

or disapproval of design projects.

Phasing
For the sake of convenience and practicality.
Strategy would be implemented in three phases.
years.

the

each of five

The consultants are aware that flexibility will be

necessary as the type and rate of development proposals
response of the private sector)
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are assessed.

(the

The report

suggests that the phasing will "serve as a guide to the
operations of the Providence Company and the D.P.D.
illustration of what is possible"
Briefly,

Phase I

(1986-1990)

and as an

(p.60).
calls for concentration of

effort upon the Retail District with particular emphasis upon
Westminster Mall.

Projects such as the Outlet,

Shepard's,

the Entertainment Center and Weybosset Crescent would be
initiated.

Concomitantly, would be the completion of the

Lasalle Square office development,

ground breaking for

parking structures on Washington and Fountain Streets,

the

initiation of the Attractions Strategy and the establishment
of the Providence Company.
Phase II

(1990-1995) would see a major emphasis upon

downtown housing,

particularly in the middle- to upper

middle-income sectors.
predominate.

Upper floor conversions would

In addition,

there would be an emerging market

for luxury condominiums in the tower at Union Station and on
the Dyer Street Waterfront.
in both Class 'A'

and 'B'

The absorption of office space

structures would pick up speed,

while retail expansion would take the form of 30,000 square
feet of infill on Westminster Mall.
would be added:
Park,

Two new attractions

the Arts Factory and the Waterfront Theme

the latter to include an historic steamship exhibit.
Phase III

(1995-2000)

predicts 420 units of housing

developed in more peripheral areas of downtown such as the
Waterfront,

Capital Center and the Jewelry District.

square feet of office space would be occupied,
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700,000

600,000 square

feet of it in new structures in Capital Center and on Dyer
Street.

The retail component of Union Station would be

completed (60,000 square feet)

together with a new apparel

anchor at Westminster and Snow (30,000 square feet).

Parking

structures for 1,600 new spaces would be built next to the
Courthouse and the new waterfront office building.

-

Program costs
The Providence Company -

the key vehicle of

implementation for the Strategy - would be activated on a
full-time basis in 1987.

Its operating budget for the first

year would be $660,000 plus a one-time capital allowance of
$40,000 to cover furniture,
a total of $700,000

furnishings and equipment,

(Carr-Lynch-Levine,

1986).

giving

The operating

budget would increase by one percent per year to annual
amount of $751,000 in the year 2000.
for the agency over 14 years,

Total cumulative cost

including interest,

would be

$9,977,000.
The Providence Company would oversee and coordinate the
development of the following:
cost of $4,000,000);

the Attractions Strategy (at a

the ten parking garages

(at a cost of

$27,086,000); and the ring road improvements

(at a cost of

$500,000).

The total operating

Company and the above outlays,

' co~ts

of the Providence

plus debt service for all

improvements through the year 2000, would be $31,032,000.
These total costs would be supported largely through tax
increment income from new development over the fifteen year
period in the sum of $26,611,000.
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An additional $2,406,000

would be derived from the increase in value to be generated
from revaluation.

The remaining $2.015.000 would be derived

from common area or promotion payments by retail
establishments as new leases are concluded starting in 1993.
The Downtown Planning Area would correspond to the new Tax
Increment Financing District starting in 1986.
activation of the Providence Company in 1987.

Assuming
the Development

Strategy Program would begin to incur costs a year in advance
of potential supporting income from T.I.F •.

Temporary

anticipation notes would therefore be necessary for a period
of up to three years in advance of the tax increment process.
Table 4.1 is a detailed summary of the Development Strategy
Financing Program as developed for the report.

4.4

Anticipated community benefits
The Downtown Development Strategy.

initiated and managed

by the Providence Company in the manner proposed by the CarrLynch-Levine study.

claims to generate the following

substantial benefits for the City of Providence and its
residents:
1.

Employment offices,

More than 12.000 jobs would be added in

stores.

service establishments.

institutions

and other developments in the Downtown Planning Area by
(an average increase of more than 800

the year 2000

per year over 15 years).
2.

Construction

-

More than $200.000.000 of new

construction and rehabilitation would be put in place
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in the Downtown Planning Area by the year 2000

(an

average of more than $13,300,000 a year over 15 years).

3.

Retail/Restaurant Sales -

This sector would increase

from approximately $50,000,000 in 1985 to $100,000,000
in the year 2000

(1985 dollar value).

Expenditures per

employee would increase as a result of broadening
shopping opportunities,

and the number of employees

would increase as demand from a wider market area
grows.

4.

Property Values and Tax Income -

Approximately

$5,000,000 per year in additional property tax income
would flow to the City by the year 2000,

generated by

new development and by conversion of vacant commercial
space to residential use.

Additional property tax

income would be generated by the current revaluation
program and by the proposed downtown tax increment.

5.

The Downtown Neighborhood -

A final benefit,

not

directly quantifiable, would be the creation of a
multi-faceted downtown neighborhood:

more people in

the streets in non-office hours and more young,
energetic individuals who will be educated and therefore
constitute a strong lobby for safety,

services and

sensible management.
These recommendations and anticipated benefits combine
to paint a rosy picture of future downtown life.
any planning document,

there are flaws.

But,

as in

Whether or not these

flaws will deter the Administration from embracing the report
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wholeheartedly is the subject of a personal response to the
consultants' work in the following chapter.

***
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CHAPTER 5
A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE STRATEGY ON ITS FACE:
A PERSONAL RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTANTS' REPORT
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"The city has fallen prey to an attitude that can
be called urban Darwinism

the survival of only

the most lucrative use of any given plot of land."
Paul Goldberger.

1982

"Was it ever the intention of our city planners to
have a downtown in which every block seems to be
developed to its utmost financial potential?"
David Smith.
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1980

5.1

The context for criticism
Planners are no different from others operating within

the urban scene in that they are subject to continuous
change.

They are different in that they are a specialized

component of public policy charged with intervening in the
process of change to mould the urban scene in the public
interest.
This matter of intervention is a contentious one.

To

what extent intervention will take place is subject to the
political and economic climates.

as well as to prevailing

public opinion.
In the current mood of the New Conservatism.

local

government is constrained on the one hand by containment and
contraction in intergovernmental revenue exchange and.

on the

other. by a private sector whose good health promotes
development.
Coordinating public redevelopment strategies and the
ambitions of the market in order to bring about positive
change in central cities is no more and no less than a
balancing act.

Coaxing the market to perform in the public

interest demands of the planner unique skills in the
mobilization of diverse actors and resources.

Whether or not

the QowE!£~E R££Yi~~E£~ Q~y~l£E~~E! ~!E~!~gy enhances that
City's ability to generate growth in its core.

not only for

the developers but for the citizenry at large.

is the subject

of this chapter; an analysis and critique.
The analysis attempts to remain within the confines of
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the Strategy and the contextual setting of downtown
Providence.

The assumption is made at the outset that one

does not need to know the

'universe'.

However, where the

observation suggests weaknesses in underlying constructs,
arguments for alternative approaches venture into the realms
of social and economic externalities.
An effort is made to lead all suggestions and
recommendations back to their applicability to downtown.
order to do this,

a question is posed as guarantor:

any additional information or further analyses,
the consultants,

In

How will

overlooked by

help the Mayor and his executive advisors in

promoting downtown redevelopment and future management?

5.2

An orientation of opinions
The parameters set by the consulting firm determine the

goals they set for themselves and,

therefore,

for the City.

It is one aim of this chapter to state the assumptions of the
Development Strategy and to critique them.
Such a critique will be colored by the preconceptions,
mind set and knowledge of the critic.

It is hoped that the

biases will be apparent and need not be set down here.
effort is both an intuitive and substantiated attempt to
clarify a personal response to the Strategy.

5.3

The development of the Strategy. an overview

The scope of the report
Carr, Lynch Associates have set down clearly the

This

parameters of their study.
historic core:

" ... its focus has been on the

that area bounded by the highways and the

river".
An analysis of existing conditions comprehensively
describes current physical and socio-economic characteristics
of Downtown in well-defined functional areas.
'Development Plans.

Trends and Opportunities'

A sub-section.
(pp.23-27)

looks at the processes of change.
While Carr. Lynch state that their concentration is upon
the office worker market.

they also note that downtown "will

not come fully alive and prosper on this market alone".
question is raised.

The

therefore. why did the financial analysis

performed by Melvin Levine Associates concentrate solely on
this limited.

existing market?

The omission of further research in this area is no
doubt based upon the prior experiences of the consultants.
However.

of the three broad 'Goals of the Strategy'

(p.47).

one is devoted to "increased shopping by area residents •.. "
It is felt that the implicit assumptions of the document
that there is a citywide or regional market to be tapped

(no

matter how marginal in anticipated impact). without further
investigation. borders on conjecture.
Without establishing the precise role of downtown
Providence as a retail and service center.

it might be

difficult to convince major business concerns to locate and
to make the physical improvements.
accessibility and parking.

particularly in respect to

necessary to attract a wider
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market.
We do not need to know the

'universe'.

It is a fact

that Warwick has become the retail capital of Rhode Island
with a sphere of influence across much of the state (refer to
the economic analysis in Chapter 2).

While avoiding the

hypothetical constructs of complex location theories.

it

might have been appropriate for the consultants to have
conducted an analysis of:
(a)

The goods and services offered by Warwick;

(b) A tax base analysis.

over time.

to establish

the changing patterns of revenues;
(c)

The market pull factor in terms of distance-decay;

(d)

A Nearest Neighbor Analysis using Reilly's Coefficient
to establish the breakpoint of markets between
Providence and Warwick.
While these methodologies are far from complex.

they

might help to establish:
(a)

The current role of Providence in the pattern of retail
trade;

(b) Whether Providence fulfills a regional role in the
provision of goods and services.

and in what sectors;

(c) Whether Providence is being bypassed by consumers in the
north of the state in their selection of Warwick;
(d)

The role of malls in redefining the role of the central
city in an urbanized state;

(e)

Clarification of the most appropriate response by the
City to the prevailing economy in maximizing outcomes
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of public monies expended on redevelopment efforts;
(f)

Avoidance of duplication of service provision in areas
Providence is not financially/fiscally able to compete.
Rhode Island does not have powers to plan on a truly

regional basis.
with another.

Municipalities are in direct competition one

despite the fact

of the same urban system.

that they are all components

Interstate highways are linear.

The succession of individual economies along them is not.
In order to make the report's goals more relevant to a
secure economic future downtown and to establish a scope such
that regional trends are understood and encompassed by
proposed strategies.

a limited regional economic analysis

might have been useful.

At present.

the summarized impacts

of the Strategy are not convincing (pp.6-7).
merely suggest that.

Rather than

"This is the kind of process which we

have seen in Boston and many other cities".

the consultants

ought to be encouraged to confirm their assumptions.
The City needs to know more.

The scope must be

broadened to facilitate efficient planning.

The Overall Development Strategy
In his secon~ 'State of the City Address'
Joseph R.

Paolino. Jr.

(1986).

Mayor

indicated that despite recent

attention upon downtown.

his administration would never

forsake the neighborhoods:

"Those whose interests lie in

downtown development must understand the depth of our
commitment to the neighborhoods".
Nowhere in the report is there a reference to downtown
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Providence's role as a component element of a citywide urban
system.

The core is viewed as a self-contained entity.

Perhaps even more serious than the regional deficiencies
detailed above,
the functional

then,

is an absence of research in respect to

relationship between the core and surrounding

areas of the City of Providence.

This relationship is the

outcome of processes operating throughout the historic
development of Providence and is recognized by the Rhode
Island Historical Preservation Commission, which stated in
its Downtown Providence Report of 1981,
[of historic buildings and landmarks]
in a city-wide context ••• ".

"The Downtown Survey

must further be viewed

recognizing the interdependence

and continuity of functional development in the city's
geographic districts.
Downtown areas have seen their role either supplanted or
subsumed by suburban or urban fringe developments,
particularly in the manufacturing and retail sectors
(Friedman,

1981).

But,

as Susan Feinstein has noted (1981),

there is something more than a residual role performed by the
core in its servicing of the needs of residents of inner city
neighborhoods.

The report neither acknowledges nor builds on

the existing and potential Providence markets.
In making unsubstantiated assumptions about the
insignificance of both intra- and inter-city market trends
and patterns,

the Strategy is lacking in its analysis of the

city's economic base.

Doubts may therefore be raised as to

the accuracy of its future scenarios and financial specifics.
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By insularising its

'Overall Development Strategy'.

the

analysis concentrates on maximizing the response of the
existing private sector economy to significant public sector
activity.

The development strategy is thorough enough within

the confines of its limited ambition.

but the sum of its

parts gives few guarantees to those who might have doubts
about assumption reliability.

An underlying assumption.

for example. might be that certain 'knock-on'

effects of the

thriving Boston economy would be felt in Providence.
so.

Quite

but to what extent1

The plan of action
The operational aspects of the report have been well
thought out.

The proposed Providence Company and the

detailed 'Action Strategies'
area of phased policy.

(p.48)

show astuteness in the

in terms of broad theory if not in the

specifics of application.
Particularly reassuring is the notion of employing a
professional staff to support the activities of the
Providence Company.
and realtors.

Financial advice from qualified bankers

for example. would be crucial in helping plans

win support from the business community.

Such external

expertise would complement the knowledge of the Department of
Planning and Development which.

perhaps wisely. would have

some control over the allocation of program funding.
according to the consultants'

model

(p.48.

para.4).

The hierarchical linkages between public.

private and

public-private agencies certainly deal with potential
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accusations of venturism,

but it is possible that the already

comprehensive supply of administrative units would become
somewhat top-heavy should another be created (see Chapter 6
for a more detailed analysis of this potential problem).

The

roles of the City and the Department of Planning and
Development in the implementation of the strategies remain a
little ambiguous.
a check.

They appear to have the ability to act as

Should not they be more active?

While much emphasis is placed upon an anticipated
positive response from the private sector,
improvements and actions

(pp.51-57)

the related public

to improve misjudged

design decisions of the past and to create a more seductive
physical fabric in the future are indeed impressive.
treatment for Westminster Mall,

The new

the execution of a free-

flowing ring road system and the use of tax increment
financing for servicing debts on parking structures are both
timely and location-appropriate policies.
when viewed in map and plan form,

These schemes,

appear intelligently

logical solutions to physical problems which have become
compounded over time.

It is in these areas that public

monies might most efficaciously be disposed of,

given the

anticipated response of the private sector.

5.4

Elements of the report
This chapter is not intended to be damning.

retrospect

However,

(and it is hoped there would be no such need),

should the Strategy fail

to hold solutions to the downtown
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in

economy,

this student would not recommend that policy makers

look back through its pages for alternative wisdom.
The

'bottom line'

solution is getting more people

with more dollars downtown.

Whether or not the consultants'

recommendations will help to do this is the subject of a
critique of the program elements.

Having commented upon the

validity of the scope and goals of Carr, Lynch Associates'
work and generalized about subject matter and coverage,
specific schemes are now reviewed in the light of negative
statements already made about the market analysis.

Bright lights and colorful canopies
The 'Disneyland Gambit'
Providence.

is to be played in Downtown

A potential developer of the Outlet Store

property proposes an enclosed mall as a specialty retail
center.
The moderate successes of the Arcade and the Davol
Square developments are to be translated into a centrally
located festival-type market area with the unreserved
endorsement of the report.

But where are the figures?

It is

clear to all who live and work downtown that there are times
of the day when the core is dead.

Evening and weekend

activities exhibit a paucity which belies the term central
city.

There is no defined historical background or specified

linkage of the proposed mall with any other current or
proposed activity,

nor does the retail strategy consider

potential linkages with possible attractions on the new
Waterfront or within the Capital Center area.
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Once again

there is a problem of isolating sites from the market.
The market itself is not specified other than in the term.
"area residents".

The question might be posed.

"Can downtown

Providence support two or more specialty store/festival-type
developments?"

The report ought to specify who the new

tenants might be and what clientele they might attract.
The proposed development of an entertainment complex
more directly addresses the problem of an empty core.

This

would undoubtedly be a pull factor to area residents and
heighten the profile of downtown.
and identity to a central zone.

Bright lights lend warmth
Coupled with the

recommendations for working with restauranteurs.
entertainment proprietors and retail businessmen to improve
facades and signage

(p.84).

physical design proposals.

as well as the elements in the
the report's concentration on

revamping the night-time tone of the area appears both valid
and workable.

Offices. offices everywhere
Considering the extent to which the economy is assumed
to rely on a thriving office sector.

it is perhaps surprising

that. while housing and retail activity are deemed worthy of
separate chapters.
of sub-sections

off ice development is inserted as a series

(p.31.

p.40).

Yet.

the first goal of the

report is to "Attract new office growth to locations within
the core.

as a first priority"

This anomaly aside.

(p.2).

it is surprising that the

cornerstone of Carr. Lynch/Mel Levine's Development Strategy

91

does not examine the existing office economy,
provide a profile of likely future clients,
the vaguest terms.

let alone

in anything but

Vacancy rates and absorption rates are

not placed in an historical setting.

It is not clear whether

Class B absorption rates are low because there is no demand
or because of poor structure condition
are current vacancies.

(p.31,

para.1).

There

The combined current absorption rate

of Class A and Class B spaces "has been proceeding at rates
of 100,000 to 200,000 square feet per year".

This vagueness

is carried through to the sub-section titled,

Phasing, where

it is recognized that Class B office space is currently oversupplied and that,

"the amount of new space added in the

first phase is about half of what can be added in later
phases".

One is left wondering what economic event is going

to precede the ability of downtown Providence to support
large increases in office space.
What about those individuals who owned the now vacant
Class B spaces?

Where are they now?

Why should they and

others like them come downtown?

- A pleasant place for people to live
The six major areas designated for residential
It is refreshing to see the

development are well chosen.

promotion of residential uses in the retail core

(p.98).

The

proposed rehabilitation of the Shepard's building and the
upper floors of the Outlet Company will contribute to a
stronger presence outside office hours.
The upper floors along Westminster Mall are thought to
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be of some value as residences.
substantiation of this.

but there is no

The over-concentration on luxury

condominium developments and costly conversion dwellings will
change the flavor of downtown and greatly inflate property
values.

However.

the housing strategy does address the need

to maximize space utilization.

given the shortfalls in

anticipated land take-up during the earlier phases of the
project.
It is recognized and accepted that the consultants did
not see themselves as social engineers in any philanthropic
sense of the term.
land use patterns.

But given the City's ability to influence
it is hoped that the administration would

look beyond the optimization of developers'

profit margins by

providing incentives to less exclusive residential
development.

The homeless problem in Providence will worsen

considerably and the "urban Darwinism" feared by Goldberger
become a reality if the public sector does not stem
profiteering in land speculation.
\

The fault does not lie

Neither should they be

with individual developers.

discouraged from participating fully in the redevelopment of
downtown Providence.

Rather.

a more balanced approach to

residential construction should be derived whereby outcomes
include both private profit and a mix of dwellings.

Planners

should remind themselves that while their first priority
might be to patch up the city's financial structure.
have a duty to the wider public interest.
The Mayor and his department directors should be
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they

encouraged to promote an assessment of housing need for low income as well as upper income dwellings -

both

to

underwrite and complement the stated perceptions of likely
market provision.
The mechanisms for leveraging alternative funding are
excellently presented (p.110)

and should indeed be

incorporated into the strategy for residential development.

5.5

Conclusions: a personal reaction of guarded optimism
With something bordering on guarded optimism.

the City

of Providence should be encouraged to embrace the general
tenet of the Strategy.

Its stance is one of realism at a

time when public funds are restricted.

The City has many

responsibilities and must allocate its monies equitably among
valid competing interests.
The major reservations expressed in this chapter implore
the City to participate in on-going research into the role of
Providence and its most appropriate future development.
does not mean that Phase I
specified in the document.

This

of the plan should not go ahead as
Not knowing the 'universe'

part and parcel of public decision-making.

is

Yet there should

be moves toward reduced dependence on the market to bring
about growth.

The City ought never to allow itself to become

a pawn in its own plan.

The issues over the roles of the

public and private sectors being hammered out in discussions
over the Capital Center project should be brought to bear on
downtown itself.

How sad it would be if the good intentions
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of the current administration were frust r ated by the equally
well-intentioned private sector's desire to earn for

its

shareholders a handsome return.
Let not
report

the words at

(p.119)

the opening of Chapter 8 in the

be repeated at

the turn of the next century:

"Despite all this positive activity,

the long awaited

downtown renaissance is not yet dramatically visible.

Indeed

there is a sense in the old retail core of continuing
decline,

with a few bright spots.

***
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Why is this so? •.•••• "

CHAPTER 6
THE EXISTING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
IN DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE
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"A peculiar combination of provincialism and
pride seemed to hold the city back •.• "

"Mayor Cianci was forced from off ice after
being convicted of assaulting a contractor
whom he suspected was carrying on an affair
with his estranged wife •••
Jr.,

30,

Joseph R.

Paolino,

squeaked into City Hall after

winning a hotly contested special election
by 12 votes ••• "

Caroline Knapp and Peter Kadzis,

1986

on politics and development in Providence
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6.1

Relevance of the existing milieu to planning
It has been the experience of researchers conducting

empirical studies of planners and their environments,

that

planners often avoid conflict and controversy by invoking the
obscure ethics of rational objectivity.
notes:

Rabinovitz

(1967)

"Although the addition of roles required for

implementation may be only an adjunct to other conflicts
between the skills needed by planners and the requirements of
professionalism,

it does not appear that even if the resource

potential of planners for exerting influence is substantial,
their disposition to use these resources in the political
arena is limited".
fro~i~~Q£~

Before assessing the impact of the
Q~~~1££~~Q!

~!~~!~gy

professionals

Q£~Q!£~Q

upon the Administration's planning

(the theme of Section II),

a summary is

provided here of the structure of planning and management
agencies currently operating downtown,

as well as an

assessment of why another agency might be needed.
Such an overview is considered essential to an understanding
of the mechanisms for review and adoption
10 of this thesis)

(Chapters 7 through

and paramount to evaluating alternative

policies for implementation (Chapters 11 and 12).
is provided as a guide to the structure,

Table 6.1

power and role of

the many agencies currently in existence.

6.2

Fragmented planning:

who does what. when and where?

Eighteen separate entities are identified as having some
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TABLE 6.1

MATRIX OF THE STRUCTURE ANO RESPONSIBILIT'r' OF
E~ISTING DOUNTOUN AGENCIES
: ------------STRUCTURE-------------:
AGEtK'r'
TITLE

PLIBLI C
BOCl'r'

BUSINE SS OUNERS ANO
MANAGERS ASSOCIATION

PR II/ATE
MEMBERSHIP
NON- PROFIT ORGANIZATION
><

CAPITAL CENTER conn.

:-:

CI T'r' COUtKI l CMTTEE.
ON URBAN REOEVELOPT,
RENEUAL AND PLANNING

H

CIT'r' PLAN COMMISSION

:-:

DEPT. OF PLANNING
fHm DEVELOPMENT

:-:

:------ - -----POUE~S------------:

LOAN
MFll< CNG

GRANT
GIVING

:zotHNG/
BOND DESIGN
FUND~;
REVIEU

:------------------ -- -- --- --ROLE------------- - - - ------------:
TECHNICAL/ PROMOTIONAL/
EOU CFITI otff!L
MARt~ETI NG

LOBE•'r'ING

:-:

><

G~ERTE~ PROVIOENtE
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

x

x

><

><

x

><

><

x

:-:

i-:

x

x

>:

><

><

l-:

><

x

><

x

x

IN TOUN

x

x

x

>:

PF:OMENADE CENTER

x

x

x

>:

:-:
x

FOUNDATION

UflSHI NC TON STREET
Bl 15 ( NE '.:· S AS~0 0CI fH I ON

:-:

!-(

x

SOCIETY

Pf:OllI DENCE
RfDEVEl.OPMENT AGENC'r'

><

;.:

x

><

x

><

><

x

>:

><

><

PF:OVI DE W~ E
P~ESERVArION

7!

><

PROVIDENCE LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Pf:011I DENCE OFF STREET PARK I t4G

><

><

:-:

><

><

x

>:

x

:-:
x

:-:

:-:

>:

i-:

><

><

x

x

><

:-:

x

GREATER PROVIDENCE
CflNllEtHI ON ANO
VI SI TORS BUF:ERU

P~:ov.

FLINCTI Ot4

><

x

PF:OV. INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORP.

ti ANA GE MEN T

><

><
)':

DOUNTOUN PROVIDENCE
IMPROVEMENT ASSOt.

PF:OV. HISTORIC
DISTRICT COMMISSION

MRI tHENfmC E/
Uf'KE Ef·

x

r:

><

><

:-:
><

:-<

>:

impact upon planning and management in downtown Providence.
While only a few of them will have prima facie
the implementation of the Strategy.
adoption.
affect -

involvement in

and even fewer in its

the ramifications of downtown development will
either directly or indirectly -

them all.
Table 6.1

the operations of

The matrix of agency structure and operation in
summarizes the descriptions below.

case in the matrix.

(As is the

agencies are listed in alphabetical

order and not in respect to their importance to the
downtown community.)

Business Owners and Managers Association
This is a local branch of a national organization.
consisting largely of property management companies and
building owners.
interests.

including banks and speculative property

It holds monthly luncheon meetings with a
Guest speakers give

comprehensive speaking program.

lectures and hold discussions aimed at updating the business
community with technical information.
to building-related problems.
supply concerns
contractors).

(utilities.

especially in respect

B.O.M.A.

also includes major

elevator companies and service

An annual membership fee helps B.O.M.A.

to

lobby for major downtown projecis iuch as the Hurricane
Barrier.

Capital Center Commission
Formed in the early 1980s by state enabling legislation
and City institution.

the Capital Center Commission is a

highly specialized supra-zoning body charged with overseeing
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the application of strict design review regulations within
the Capital Center Project Area.

Its management function

is

supplemented by its role as a comprehensive information and
technical resource.
$100.000 per year -

The C.C.C.

has an annual budget of some

apportioned equally by City and state -

with a Board approved by the Mayor of Providence.

the

Governor and the Providence Foundation.
City Council Committee on Urban Redevelopment.
Renewal and Planning
This is the major policy crunching sub-committee of the
City Council which digests and prepares urban issues to be
put before Council.

Taking its lead from the executive

planning professionals.

the five members of the municipal

legislature who sit on this committee represent the questions
and concerns of Providence's constituents in respect to urban
development.
City Plan Commission
Final legislative approval of zoning is granted by this
body. which holds open public meetings and grants variances
and special exceptions.

Technical support is furnished by

the Department of Planning and Development.

which works with

the Commission to generate relevant zoning ordinances and
updates to the city's master and neighborhood plans.

as well

as to the Capital Improvements Budget.
Department of Planning and Development
This large city agency is the official executive
planning body of Providence.

but it encompasses a wide range
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of planning and planning-related research and line functions.
The Department
separate.

is a composite of numerous.

previously

government agencies which were combined under the

Paolino Administration for the sake of efficiency.

The

Department operates under the following broad sections:
Economic Development.
Construction.
Affairs.

Neighborhood Services.

Policy and Legal Affairs.

Management and

Planning.

and Fiscal

Its structure makes the Department uniquely

adaptable to planning at both the metapolicy and neighborhood
level.

- Downtown Providence Improvement Association
This private.

non-profit agency is paid.

in part.

by the

City to maintain and upkeep the streetscapes of downtown
Providence and.
years.

in particular.

the D.P.I.A.

Westminster Mall.

In recent

has become expert in the technologies of

garbage disposal and street maintenance.

as well as in

formulating employment policies for Providence's youth and
minority populations.

Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce
The Chamber was originally established in the late 19th.
century to serve the interests of the city's merchants.

Its

membership has expanded to include much of northern Rhode
Island's metropolitan region.

many subscribers holding

membership of a local chamber as well as the Providence
Chamber.

The G.P.C.C.

is increasingly involving itself in

more socially oriented programs care.

for example -

Jobs for Youth and child

and is able to receive federal monies and
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make loans and grants with its 501-C.3 tax status.

Its

lobbying power is directed mainly toward state economic
issues;

it created the Providence Foundation to focus on

specifically downtown concerns.
Greater Providence Convention and Visitors Bureau
an Authority and a line or

The Bureau has two arms:
service function.

The Authority is an entity created through

state enabling legislation,
percent

whose funds derive from a 2

room tax on the three downtown hotels

(the Biltmore,

Its Board includes the general

Holiday Inn and Marriot).

managers of all three hotels.

The Authority is obligated to

pass on its budget to the service function of the Bureau
which has an Executive Committee and a membership
organization

(consisting of downtown restauranteurs,

owners and travel agents).
packages

bar

The Bureau assembles convention

(in conjunction with the hotels)

and runs an

information/promotion service for visitors to the city.
-

In Town
A branch of the Chamber of Commerce,

was founded in 1976.

Its membership consists largely of the
The agency is limited

retail sector of the Chamber.
least,

this organization

in its current guise)

(at

to running a promotional

calendar, while its influence is constrained due to the
decline in the representation of retail uses in recent years.
Members are overwhelmingly individual store owners from whom
money is raised annually,
advertising campaigns.

essentially for seasonal
In Town is typical of central city
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'advertising cooperatives'.
-

Promenade Center
This is a

revitalization project on a scale rarely seen

in Providence.

It is a private

ef~ort

by a consortium of

developers and commercial interests to develop the old
Foundry Building on the fringe of downtwon.

Still in its

planning phase,

a conference

center,

the construction of a hotel,

shops and residential units -

complex -

in one integrated

will greatly contribute to the renaissance of

central Providence.
Providence Historic District Commission
P.H.D.C.

is a supra-zoning organization established to

enforce overlay zoning districts on College Hill and
Broadway.

Its members are mayoral appointees,

the City Council.

endorsed by

The Commission would be of considerable

importance to downtown were the City to use historic zones as
a means of regulatory land use control in parts of the
Downtown Planning District.
Providence Industrial Development Corporation
Established in 1980,
financing entity.

the P.I.D.C.

is essentially a

Its Board is appointed by the Chamber and

the City and therefore combines the development
both private and public sectors.
derives from the City,

interests of

Funding appropriation

as well as E.B.A.

and S.B.A.

monies.

The agency constructs financing packages for local firms,
focus being primarily upon industrial uses.
self-perpetuating revolving funds and has 503
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P.I.D.C.
status.

uses

its

-

Providence Foundation
Established in 1974,

the Foundation has charitable

status and is a 501-C.3 agency.

It raises its operating

budget by soliciting contributions from the top fifty
downtown corporations,

while its tax status enables it to

obtain supplementary funds

from government agencies.

Foundation does not own land,
Rather,

The

nor does it make loans.

its role is one of catalyst for downtown project
The agency conducts feasibility studies and

initiation.

lobbies government agencies to this end.
Providence Local Development Corporation
The P.L.D.C.

has ten Board Members appointed by the

Mayor who serve terms lasting two years.
are used for feasibility studies,
C.D.B.G.

float,

revolving loan funding,

a 503 participatory scheme

with the Small Business Association),

(in association

and in the initiation

lower than that of the private banks,

$2,800,000,

a

Its loan default rate is much

of major development projects.

approximately 4 percent.

Block Grant funds

running at

Total available assets run at

a budget primarily applied to the elimination of

blighted commercial properties.
Providence Off-Street Public Parking
This is a state enabled,

City instituted agency charged

with the specific task of developing,

revitalizing and

managing the city's parking garages.

P.O.S.P.P.

bond monies to fund its activities.
Thomas Moses,

Its chairperson is

Deputy Director of D.P.D.
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uses revenue

Providence Preservation Society
This agency's focus

is the preservation of buildings of

architectural and historic significance.

It has established

a separate non-profit financing branch which offers loans.
from a revolving loan program.
The P.P.S.

is a private.

with no public powers.

for rehabilitating buildings.

non-profit membership organization
However.

its expertise and

influential membership make it an effective lobbying
mechanism.
Providence Redevelopment Agency
The P.R.A.

is the city's official redevelopment agency.

created by state enabling legislation in the late 1940s.

It

has full public powers and has played a substantial role in
the processes of urban renewal and urban revitalization in
Providence.

All land which the Agency condemns and acquires

must be disposed of.

according to statute. within five years.

Washington Street Business Association
This private membership organization looks to the
interests of the restaurant and retail uses on Washington
Street.

It is an information-sharing and lobbying

group designed to stabilize the use composition and
streetscape of this marginal thoroughfare.

6.3

With all these agencies. why create another?
Eighteen agencies.

groups and committees might seem

adequate to manage a city center the size of downtown
Providence.

Yet the principal recommendation of the
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consultants in their Development Strategy is the creation of
a new management entity.

Clearly,

in their assessment of the

manner in which planning and management are currently
executed,

they found insufficient resources.

specifying the reasons

in their report,

Without

the consultants

undoubtedly reached the same conclusions as the Director of
Planning and Development with regard to the lack of
coordination in the development of downtown.
agencies are

'dormant'.

informational resource,

Too many of the

They simply provide a technical and
lobby for their own interests,

promote and market their own goods and services.
Table 6.1

or

A scan of

confirms the self-serving nature of many of the

agencies.
It is evident,
of the thesis,

in concluding this chapter and Section I

that further

steps are required in the search

for a fresh planning paradigm for downtown Providence.
Having described the existing social and economic
environments,

reviewed the substantive elements of the

Development Strategy,
weaknesses,
focus

responded to some of its strengths and

and analysed the existing planning milieu,

the

is now switched to the processes of generating a

practical response,

on the part of the City,

Lynch-Levine report.

***
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to the Carr-
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SECTION II
POLICY AND PROCESS ISSUES:
DEVELOPING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT FOR
DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND
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CHAPTER 7
ON RECEIVING THE CARR-LYNCH-LEVINE STRATEGY:
THE CITY'S RESPONSE
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"It

is a matter of common observation that

in

Western democracies public administrations and
policy analysts in general do largely limit

their

analyses to incremental or marginal differences
in policies that are chosen to differ only
incrementally.

They do not do so.

however.

solely

because they desperately need some way to simplify
their problems;
relevant.

they also do so in order to be

Democracies change their policies almost

entirely through incremental adjustments.

Policy

does not move in leaps and bounds."
Charles E.
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Lindblom.

1964

7.1

The political context
In the City of Providence,

policy most certainly does

not move in "leaps and bounds".

A history of fragmented

interest groups with poor lines of communication has given
rise to a mood of omniscient suspicion targeted directly at
the Administration.
least

Despite Paolina's efforts to foster at

the appearance of

'open government',

the

initial

reaction of many key non-governmental actors in the downtown
scene to new initiatives is that of doubt.
a

'wait and see'

At

the very best,

stance is elected in the face of new ideas

emanating from City Hall.
Even before the arrival of the completed
f~£Yi~~E£~ Q~y~1£E~~E! ~!~~!~~Y·

leveled at

the Administration.

Q£~E!£~E

several criticisms were
Based upon a number of

interviews conducted as background for

this chapter,

these

criticisms can be summarized as follows:
1.

The Strategy was seen in some quarters as an attempt by
the Mayor to validate consultants city core.

by using supposedly objective

new public attention in the historic

The Paolino family owns sizable property

holdings in this area of downtown.
2.

This was

the first

time in over twenty years

that an

Administration had commenced upon a new planning
initiative in downtown Providence without consulting
the private sector in respect to problem definition
and goal setting.
3.

The study process did not
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involve key downtown actors

from numerous.
the

existing agencies whose involvement

implementation of the Strategy and.

1n

in particular.

the establishment of the Providence Company was deemed
essential by the consultants
4.

Input

in their report.

from the private sector was limited to information

sought during interviews by Melvin Levine in the
execution of his market analysis.

Fact

rather than

opinion was the basis of this exercise.

Criticism was

therefore retrospective and reactive rather than used
as an input device.
5.

The consultants were hired without comment from the
various downtown agencies,

public and private.

brief from the Mayor was not made public.

and their

In short,

the

downtown community did not know what this new initiative
would involve,

either during the plan generation stage

or in the long-term.
6.

The consultation allowed for in the two presentations
given by Steven Carr and Melvin Levine were not
sufficient as a forum for open debate.

Copies of the

Development Strategy were not available to individuals
who attended and they were not prepared to respond to
the brief overview given.
7.

When the Strategy was presented at a meeting of the
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce,

Melvin Levine

gave vague responses to the questions posed about
the financing of the proposals and ignored suggestions
that Tax Increment Financing was
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inappropriate in the

city.

T.I.F.

was

the cornerstone of the implementation

package he proposed in the document.
8.

No representatives from the existing downtown
residential community were invited to the presentations
of the Strategy.

7.2

Rumblings of discontentment
Given the negative feelings

noted above.

the City was

forced to consider the opinions of a wider audience.

The

presentations referred to in the above list took place amid a
mixed press coverage.
Journal by Dr.

A series of articles in the Providence

Chester Smolski.

at Rhode Island College.
summer. were at

a professor of Urban Affairs

throughout the spring and early

the same time encouraging and skeptical.

Acknowledged as a key public commentator on urban and
planning affairs.

Smolski feared that while the "time was

ripe" for a fresh approach to downtown development.

the

private sector would need to be directly involved in policy
making.

Clearly.

the City had failed to facilitate

throughout the planning process.

this

Chapter 8 deals with the

way the review process sought to overcome some of the
inadequacies which emerged as a result of the closed process
of plan development.
One more negative external factor which contributed
toward the "summer of review" was a letter in the Providence
Journal on June 5.

1986.

The letter.

critic of the Paolino Administration.
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by Ilse Politzer.

a

criticized the cost of

the Strategy

($75,000)

"the plan has got
that

some imagination to it".

Politzer noted,

this "latter quality eludes me completely."

consultants'

recommendations for

more parking garages,
that

and denounced the Mayor's comment that

As for

the

increased office space and

Politzer wrote,

"There is no question

the various notables to whom the Mayor is going to

submit plan and vehicle for
After all,
planters,

review will approve of both.

they also approved of Westminster Mall,
police booth,

benches,

canopies and the Muzak of its

beginnings."
By the time this piece appeared,

the private sector was

beginning to ruminate about whether the entire downtown plan
was no more than a costly exercise in "planning in a vacuum".
But the Department of Planning and Development was
orchestrating its attempt to sell the Strategy:
himself took personal charge of the
were appointed to a
a

the Director

review process;

members

new Downtown Development Task Force;

and

summer intern was appointed to conduct research and execute

an opinion-seeking questionnaire on its behalf.

The

effectiveness of these measures are analyzed in the next
chapter.
As

the Mayor and his prof es s i o·n a 1 p 1 an n in g s t a ff b e g an

to establish a considered response to the Strategy in terms
of how best

to apply it,

a letter was

received from Executive

Director of the Providence Preservation Society, Wendy
Nicholas.
but

it

As Table 6.1

shows,

the PPS has no public powers,

is a fierce lobbying organization and a
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firm exponent

of strict design review in the city.

Nicholas expressed

concern about modifying traditional cobble stone streets on
the proposed upgraded downtown ring road and requested closer
attention to design review.
but

in respect

to "other design review entities.

what makes them work well.
Perhaps the key
follows.
thought.

not only in terms of standards.
to determine

or not."

reservation noted by Nicholas was as

"The Providence Company requires substantial
We are concerned about

organizational jurisdiction.
the Providence Foundation?

the overlap in

What's to be the role vis a vis
How to deal with the highly

probable competition in marketing efforts between the
Providence Company and the Capital Center Commission?

How

does the Downtown Providence Improvement Association fit

in?

To whom will the Board be accountable?" All these were direct
and pertinent questions.
had read the report.

raised by Nicholas even after she

It was apparent to the senior staff at

the Department of Planning and Development that the private
sector.

the citizen groups and the non-profits would demand

answers to these and other questions very soon.
were not provided.

If answers

the Development Strategy would never be

more than another shelved document.

7.3

"In-house" review of the Strategy
In his second

'State of the City Address'.

Mayor Paolino

had instructed the Department of Planning and Development to
report

to him by the spring of 1986 with concrete policies
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for downtown development.

But the Carr-Lynch-Levine Strategy

was not presented in satisfactory form until late April
initial draft

arrived in March)

(the

and the senior staff's

attention to it came too close to the summer's local election
campaign for anything
Instead.

a

'concrete'

to be decided upon.

review process was started.

This served the dual

purpose of addressing complaints from the private sector that
downtown planning was being conducted behind closed doors.
and postponing downtown initiatives
neighborhoods)

(always unpopular in the

until after the November elections.

The

Administration was fairly comfortable with Paolino's
standing,

but former mayor,

he would run again.
threat

Cianci,

had not denied

He was perceived as posing a potential

to the incumbent,

public forum -

Vincent A.

so stability -

at least

in the

was the order of the day.

Arthur Markos,

Department Director.

sincerely believed

that the plan offered genuine opportunities for coordinated
downtown planning and attempted to make the process more
accessible.

But before allowing external comment and before

the Strategy was released for public

review,

an in-house

critique was conducted.
The general air was of disappointment.

$75,000 had been

expended on consultants who came highly recommended.
somehow their report was so generalized,
bland,

that

it failed to

Yet.

so inoffensive.

ignite the imagination.

Many of the

recommendations were seen as generic planning solutions.
unoriginal and boring.

While the findings
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so

of the Levine

market analysis confirmed what property managers and
developers had been saying for two years,

there seemed to be

little validation for adopting all the recommendations
wholesale.

This student,

hired as a summer research intern,

criticized the Strategy in several informal meetings with the
Department Director,
Kathy Field,

Arthur Markos,

and the City Planner,

in a manner approximating to the statements made

in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
selling the report,

There was little hope of

as submitted,

to the Administration and

the business community.
While a personal response to the Strategy is presented
in Chapter 5,

the views of the Department were less severe in

their negativity.

Many of Steve Carr's design proposals were

seen as useful suggestions for implementation.

Indeed,

several key factors were viewed by senior staff as deserving
of serious consideration.

But almost as many questions arose

from the report as were answered by it.
identified by the Department,
1.

Office growth rates -

The key issues,

as

might be summarized as follows:

What should be the official public

sector role with regard to encouraging and influencing
off ice sector growth,

the Foundry development and the

Capital Center Project Area over and above circulation
improvements?

Will Carr-Lynch-Levine's absorption

rates hold over the lengthy prescribed plan period?
2.

Office development -

Is there a need to change the

City's stance from regulatory body to entrepreneurial
body,

must

it facilitate

rather than constrain?
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How

can the outdated property tax structure be changed to
induce absorption of vacant buildings?

Would an

immediate off ice marketing strategy be a year
premature?

Is the City's policy of placing historic

preservation over development incentives a valid one?
3.

Retail development -

Why are people not shopping in

central Providence? Where are they shopping?
the City ensure security for
the key?

If management

shoppers?

is the solution.

How does

Is marketing
what

is the

best form of management vehicle for central Providence?
4.

Attractions strategy -

How can the City afford to

maintain five attractions locations as proposed by
the consultants?
available?
public

What private sector funds are

Is there sufficient current and potential

interest to support them?

and late-night security issues?

What are the evening
Which neighborhood

associations might be able to help in their management?
Would it be better to have a city-wide attractions and
entertainments strategy.
5.

Design review -

including Roger Williams Park?

The totality and self-contained nature

of Capital Center demanded site-specific design review:
does the historic core demand the same?
specifics of the process.

What are the

regulations and enforcement?

Should design review include facades as well as setbacks.

size.

bulk.

height etc.?

How can the Providence

Preservation Society. with its acknowledged expertise.
serve downtown design review?
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What

is the public

interest

in design review -

to represent the public's
really needed,

who s h ould be empowered

taste?

Is design review

given that nine out of ten developers

comply with City

recommendations about frontages?

What American cities offer good examples of
downtown design review?

Should design review be

part of or separate from the new Providence Company?
6.

Downtown residential neighborhood encourage the use of upper floors,
consultants'

recommendations,

Can the City
as per the

for residential use?

Would a consortium of existing property owners help
to convert vacant and under-utilized structures to
downtown housing?

Is there structural compatibility

of existing uses with proposed apartment-type uses?
What

is the target market:

yuppies?
7.

artists,

students,

What about existing downtown dwellers?

Westminster Mall -

Should the City immediately

remove the unpopular streetscape aspects:
police booth,

planters,

City's financial
traffic?

lights?

benches,

What would be the

cost in opening the Mall to

Would businesses benefit from the opening?

Would new uses be encourag~d ~r discouraged?
would be the

What

immediate and long-term effects on

businesses of prolonged infrastructure construction?
What

type of design should be used:

accept

the consultants'

should the City

'Italianesque'

example?

Would vehicular congestion be a serious issue?
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Does

8.

the Mall fail

for

reasons other than its pedestrian-

only status?

Are there other solutions?

Parking and circulation -

Can the City afford to

sacrifice more prime sites to parking garages?
there a security issue?

Is

How many spaces will be

needed given an unpredictable level of demand?
on-street parking be made cheaper?
the existing ring road serve?

What

Should

function does

If thousands of dollars

are to be spent upgrading the ring road.

what will

be the overall benefits to downtown vehicular
circulation?

Is the parking/circulation problem in

downtown Providence real or perceived?
These eight elements were deemed the most
the in-house Administration reviewers)
planning and management.

However.

relevant

(by

to future downtown

the answers to most of the

questions were too controversial for them to be transplanted
into policy recommendations for the Mayor without
professional and community input.

Rather than concentrate on

the substantive issues of the report and appear to be forcing
policies upon downtown.

the Department of Planning and

Development had the wisdom to open up the process to external
review.

The eight elements were intended to be settled as

firm policies before debate began on the necessity for a new
planning and management entity.
It might be argued that
generous and democratic.

this was all far too late to be

After all.

the consultants had

completed the report and the recommendations had been
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submitted with little attention paid to those whose
involvement would be needed to implement them
sector)

or those who would be impacted

(the private

(the wider downtown

community).

It was because of the potential

controversy.

as well as the confusing diversity of

recommendations
his

in the report.

research intern.

Planner.

that Arthur Markos instructed

under the supervision of the City

to design a survey instrument to be circulated

throughout the downtown district.
hoped.

'participation'

With public input.

it was

the most practical policies would be more easily

identified.
Further.

the Mayor agreed to establish a Downtown

Development Task Force
report to Markos.

(which.

for political reasons.

not Paolino:

Paolino did not want a

would

standing committee on downtown issues associated directly
with him by the media in a

run-up to an election)

of

experienced professionals to assist the Department of
Planning and Development in the process of policy generation.
The consultants could not possibly have foreseen the level of
controversy and conflict their report would generate.
outcome of the summer review period -

the questionnaire

execution and the Task Force meetings following chapter.

***
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The

is analyzed in the

CHAPTER 8
PLAN REVIEW AND POLICY GENERATION
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"If this

thing is managed right.

it could help

to save downtown."
A questionnaire respondent.

1986

"My opinion is that another agency would be a
waste of everyone's time."
A questionnaire respondent.

1986

"I cannot comment at this time because Carr has
not been specific enough.

I

do not

really know

who would be responsible for this new agency.
What happens if we have another RIHMFC on our
hands?"
A questionnaire respondent.
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1986

8.1

Confusion out of chaos
Unfortunately for all concerned.

followed

the summer which

the City's dilemma in identifying how best to

proceed with Carr-Lynch-Levine's report did not

really

clarify the future direction of downtown planning and
management.

A survey instrument.

public and private sector opinion.
impressions that

designed to tap wider
only served to reinforce

the community was seriously divided on

issues ranging from substantive matters
Westminster Mall

to traffic)

(like opening up

to policy matters

for a new management agency).

(like the need

It should be clear to the

reader that the reason why Chapters 9 and 10 are necessary at
this stage

(November.

1986)

is that neither the City nor the

Downtown Development Task Force has ventured concrete
recommendations for

implementing the desirable components of
The last

two chapters of this thesis attempt to offer insight into
what has worked in other American cities
ultimately.

and.

to propose a theoretical framework for public-

private partnership

(Chapter 10).

This chapter catalogs the
October.

(Chapter 9)

1986.

'summer of review'.

June to

in which the findings of a survey instrument

and the deliberations of the Task Force served to
institutionalize confusion out of the chaos which
characterized the arrival of the Strategy in March.
Confusion is certainly preferable to chaos. yet little has
emerged in satisfaction of the City's need for a cohesive
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approach to the downtown community.

Meanwhile.

development

of the city's downtown fabric continues and the project-byproject.

micro-policy approach of the Department of Planning

and Development remains in place.
faire

8.2

The legacy of laissez-

is alive and well in Providence.

The execution of the survey instrument
Under the guidance of the City Planner. Kathleen Field,

this student was instructed by the Director of the Department
of Planning and Development to formulate a questionnaire
aimed at diverse downtown interest groups.

Figure 8.1

represents the survey instrument in its final form.

It was

decided to keep responses entirely attitudinal in character.
so that a hierarchy of priorities.
elements were desirable.

in terms of which Strategy

would emerge.

It was hoped that

clear distinctions would emerge between those elements of the
plan that would work and those which held little support.
In order to refine the data analysis exercise.

respondents

were requested to note whether they were from public sector
or private sector occupations

(Question 14).

The questionnaire's layout was designed so as not
emphasize one element over any other.

to

Each section of the

Carr-Lynch-Levine report was included for comment.

Further.

a blank form was attached to the questionnaire so that
detailed criticism and review could be offered by each
individual.
and,

The survey was executed on a mail-back basis

perhaps because of the low response rate which typifies
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FIGURE 8.1

PROVIDENCE BUSINESS DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
QUESTIONNAIRE:
1.

What is your overall reaction to the Providence Development Strategy?
ENTHUSIASTIC

2.

POSITIVE

NEUTRAL

NEGATIVE

DISAPPOINTED

What do you think are the most exciting elements of the Strategy?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

3.

TO SOLICIT OPINIONS AND COMMENTS (Circle Answers)

The creation of a Downtown neighborhood
The re-opening of Westminster Mall
Increased retail/restaurant/entertainment activities
Increased employment potential
·
Increased Class 'A' office space
Improved city image
Increased utilization of Downtown during weekends and evenings
Special events program
Other (Please note other elements)

Do you think that the Providence Company (a quasi-public entity)
will:
a.
b.
c.

Be a viable vehicle for implementation of the Strategy?
Have powers that are appropriate to its responsibility?
Have a financing scheme adequate to fund the Strategy?

YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO

4.

The Report calls for a Design Review Co1T111ittee which would review and
approve (according to an established set of procedures and guidelines)
major development plans. Do you agree that the City should establish
such a Cormiittee?
YES/NO

5.

Do you agree with the concept of Tax Increment Financing as proposed
YES/NO
in the Strategy for the Providence Business District?

6.

Do you also agree with the concept of a Special Assessment District?
YES/NO

7.

Do you agree that the partial re-opening of Westminster Mall is an
appropriate solution to the lack of activity during off-peak hours?
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YES/NO

FI GURE 8.1 cont .

8.

Do you think that the Housing Strategy, which assumes an income
threshold of $35,000/year to purchase/rent, will:
a.
b.

9.

Create a viable Downtown neighborhood?
Generate evening and weekend activity?

YES/NO
YES/NO

Do you think that the emphasis on physical and street design
improvements is appropriate for the Strategy's successful
implementation?

YES/NO

10. What is your opinion of the Business District's parking problem?
a. Too expensive b. Insufficient spaces c. Too far from destination
d. Problem is perceived, not real
e. Other

----------~

11. What is your reaction to the following Attractions Strategies?:

(Use this code:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

a= Enthusiastic, b =Positive, c =Neutral,
d = Negative, e = Disappointed)

Improved streetscapes and festival lighting
Entertainment Center linking Westminster Ma.,...11.--t-o Washington St.
Performance facility at Cathedral Square
-Soho-type artistic neighborhood
Waterfront activities district - Kennedy Plaza performance facilities

--

12. Downtown development is preceived as responding to an increasing demand.
Do you think Providence development could support a linkage scheme
downtown at this time?
YES/NO
13. For our files, please would you check your occupation classification:
Public Official
Developer
Banking/Finance
-Educator
Private Professional Service
Downtown Business
Other (please descri~

------

14. Thank you for filling out this questionnaire. We would appreciate
any additional conments you might have on the various aspects of the
Providence Development Strategy, as well as other elements which you
believe to be vital to successful downtown development. If you choose
to sign below, it will offer us an opportunity to get back to you for
further discussion. Please use the attached Conment Sheet.
15. This questionnaire will be used by the· Department of Planning and
Development as it makes reconrnendations to the Mayor. Please
return it within one week to: Mark Motte, c/o Department of Planning
and Development, Third Floor, 55 Eddy Street, Providence, RI 02903.
SIGNATURE (Optional) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ADDRESS/PHONE #
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such a method.

only eight percent

(25

responses)

of the 300

forms distributed were returned to the Department.
Naturally.

the questionnaire could only be sent to those

individuals who had been given access
Strategy.

to the Development

This limited the survey sample to people who had

attended the two presentations of the Strategy at City Hall
by the consultants and those who had been sent copies of the
Strategy upon request.
guests

The former group were all invited

(the presentations. while termed 'public meetings'.

were not advertised).

while the second group were almost

exclusively from the private sector

(mostly members of the

Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce).

The consultation of

the downtown community was therefore extremely limited in
scope and.

as is described below.

no members of the

residential community were invited to comment.
Representation from the small businesses. which dominate
downtown land use.

was also nominal.

A major criticism of the questionnaire ventured by one
member of the Chamber was.
Flag and apple pie?".

"Who can disagree with Mom.

In effect.

posed to elicit favorable

all the questions were

responses:

for example.

who could

disagree with the substance of the list in Question 27
many people noted was that.
almost all desirable.
not.

the

What

while the substantive issues were

the means of their implementation was

The methods by which creating a downtown neighborhood

would be achieved would bring far greater comment than merely
asking whether a downtown neighborhood was desirable.
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8.3

The findings of the survey instrument
Figure 8.2 summarizes the responses to the

questionnaire.

For the purposes of this analysis,

only

general patterns in the responses are deemed relevant
the Task Force had been appointed,
were rarely mentioned).

(once

the views of the community

Of interest,

though,

are those

points which were favored by the sample population,

but were

overlooked by the Task Force in its discussions.
An overwhelming majority of respondents favored the
elements listed in Question 2.

Only the re-opening of

Westminster Mall and the special events program were
considered undesirable.

In their comments,

both the public and private sectors felt

respondents from

that opening the

Mall was an irrelevance and not the solution to its underutilization.

Rather,

more imaginative service and goods

provision was seen as the key.

Special events were labeled

as a sub-issue to downtown revitalization:

a simple device,

but insufficient to have a lasting effect.
The concept of a new management agency
favored approximately two to one,
consultants'

(Question 3) was

but clearly the

model was not the appropriate vehicle:

the

sample was split half-and-half as to whether the agency's
powers,

as proposed, were adequate and as to whether the

financing scheme was right for Providence.
the survey execution

(early June),

there was considerable

controversy surrounding the consultants'
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At the time of

proposal and many

FIGURE 8. 2
RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Question

Response
Enthusiastic Positive Neutral Negative Disappointed

1

12

3

2

(a) 14

(b) 5

( f) 22

(g) 16

( c) 21
(h) 7

(a) YES 16

NO

(b) YES 12

NO 13

(c) YES

8

NO

4

YES

8

NO 17

5

YES

9

NO 11

6

YES

3

NO 13

7

YES

6

NO 18

8

(a) YES 13

NO

8

(b) YES 12

NO

5

YES 16

NO

6

3

9

(d) 16

4

1

(e) 19

(i) 0

9

7

10

(a) 6

11

Enthusiastic Positive Neutral Negative Disappointed

12

(b) 12

5

(c) 7

(d) 11

(a)

2

6

9

3

3

(b)

4

10

6

4

1

(c)

0

0

12

13

0

( d)

0

7

16

1

1

(e)

5

8

8

4

0

(f)

0

3

15

5

2

YES

3

NO 20

people were not clear about the issues.
the large number of people who did not

3•c •

This might explain
respond to Question

Many simply did not understand the financing proposals.
Questions 4 through 7.

concerning the fractious

of partial re-opening of the Mall at certain hours.
institutionalized design review.

Financing and Special Assessment)

(Tax Increment

were unpopular with an

overwhelming majority of respondents.
business owners.

stricter

and the two alternative

methods of downtown district financing

realtors.

issues

One hundred percent of

private professionals.

developers

and bankers/financiers were opposed to the financing scheme
as proposed in the report.

Responses to Question 12

concerning the linkage scheme

(which would permit a

proportion of monies levied in a downtown district to be
spent on neighborhood improvements)
overwhelming opposition.

also met with

These responses reflect the extreme

conservatism of the city and illustrate the difficulty of
initiating innovative planning and management techniques.
Housing was hardly a key issue among this selective
sample population.

but a majority favored the number-

crunching of Melvin Levine.

Clearly,

designated for residential use,
was essential.

if prime land was to be

profitability for developers

The $35,000 household income threshold for

access to the future downtown residential market
was seen as inevitable rather than desirable.

(Question 8)

The outcome of

this point might have been somewhat different had existing
tenants and owner-occupiers been surveyed.
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The yuppif ication

of downtown Providence has not yet occurred.

but

if the

residential policies of the consultants are adopted.
developers will ensure that

it does.

The excellent physical and street design proposals in
the report won the support of a majority of respondents
(Question 9).

In fact.

few criticisms of Steve Carr's urban

design drawings have since been made.

Many commented that

the illustrations in the report show the vast potential to be
unlocked in future downtown development.

The drawings are

particularly popular with the historic preservation lobby.
Not so the parking recommendations.

The preservationists and

public sector employees unanimously decided that parking was
a

'perceived'

problem in the downtown area.

might be expected.

felt

Businessmen,

as

that parking facilities were too

distant from their properties and that spaces were too few in
number.

As the summary responses to Question 10 illustrate.

however.

there is considerable confusion as to what the

problem is
noted.

(if indeed there is one).

As one public official

"There is always space if you are prepared to pay

$3.50 and walk a bit •••

It's still much cheaper than New York

and Boston."
Elements of the Attractions Strategy were the subject
of Question 11.

Surprisingly.

enthusiasm for any of them.
and

'glamor'

very few respondents had much

Once again,

the entertainment

aspects of the report were seen as peripheral to

the central questions of economic development.
diversity in profitable land use,
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greater

and the manner or means of

implementation.

The most popular attractions were the Art

Factory entertainment complex
Mall with Washington Street)
district

(designed to link Westminster
and the Waterfront activities

(already much acclaimed in the form of William

Warner's Providence Waterfront Plan).

The other centers were

regarded as insignificant or undesirable.
Providence.

The people of

unlike the outside consultants.

have always known

that the disastrous urban design exercise at Cathedral Square
will never amount to more than a picturesque desert.
Few real surprises.
representation.
In short.

Little consensus.

Poor community

No opinions sought about implementation.

the questionnaire was of little help to the City

and was later to be ignored by the Task Force.

A

questionnaire is usually a method of identifying public
opinion and gaining valid community input to policies.
This questionnaire achieved neither.

8.4

The appointment of a Task Force
The Downtown Development Task Force was appointed by

Mayor Joseph.

R.

Paolino.

Jr.

of Planning and Development.

on the advice of his Director
The Mayor wanted strong

representation from the business community with particular
emphasis on the Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce.
Apart

from the three senior staff of the Department of

Planning and Development
Kathleen Field).

(Arthur Markos.

Thomas Moses and

there were eighteen appointees.

and positions are furnished in Figure 8.3.
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Their names

The profile of

FIGURE 8. 3

TASK FORCE MEMBERS
DPD STAfF MEMBERS - ARTHUR MARKOS, DIRECTOR
THOMAS MOSES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN FIELD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
OTHER MEMBERS
AMATO, Richard J.
President
Kates Properties Management Co., Inc.
290 Westminster Street
Providence, RI 02903
751-9600

CARNEY ·, - a. Jay
Senior Vice President
Claremont Development Co.
175 Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 722-0900

DALE, Terry ·
Executive Director
Greater Providence Convention & Visitors Bureau
30 Exchange Terrace
Providence, RI 02903
274-1636

DOYLE, Robert
Senior Vice President
Old Stone Development Corp.
l Old Stone Square
Providence, RI 02903
278-2045

FAIRCHILD, James
Executive Director
Greate·r Providence Chamber of Commerce
30 Exchange Terrace
Providence, RI 02903
521-5000

FELDMAN, Melvin
Adjunct Professor of Urban Studies
Brown University
Box 1896, Providence, RI 02912
863-1000

FRANCIS, Charles
President
Ryan Elliott & Co.· of Rhode Island, Inc.
187 Westminster Street
Providence, RI 02903
331-0350
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FIGURE 8.3 cont.

GILBANE, Robert
Gilbane Building Company
7 Jackson Walkway
Providence, RI 02903
456-5890
HALL, Charlene
Executive Director
Capital Center Project
30 Exchange Terrace
Providence, RI 02903
274-8200
HENDERSON, John
Adler, Pollock and Sheehan
2300 Hospital Trust Tower
Providence, RI 02903
274-7200
KUMEKAWA, Glenn . ·
Inter-governmental Policy Analysis Program
The University of Rhode Island
Kingston, RI 02881
792-1000
LANGEN, E • Timothy .
Managing Director
Trinity Square Repertory Theater
201 Washington Street
Providence, RI 02903
521-1100
MAURO , Edmund M. , Jr •
Chairman
Providence Redevelopm•nt Authority
International S~pply Company
215 Niantic Avenue
Cranston, RI 02907
944-1600
NICHOLAS, Wendy
Executive Director
Providence Preservation Society
24 Meeting Street
Providence, RI 02906
831-7440
O'DONNELL, Charles
1919' Fleet Bank Building
Providence, RI 02903
421-1550
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FIGURE 8.3 cont.

SARLES, Jay
Executive Vice President
Fleet Financial Group
111 Westminster Street
Providence, RI 02903
278-6000
SHERMAN, Jane B.
Chairperson,
City Planning Commission
254 Irving Avenue
Providence, RI 02906
861-3313
SHUTTE, Thomas
President
Rhode Island School of Design
2 College Street
Providence, RI 02903
331-3511
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participants is interesting because there are no planners
(other than the in-house personnel).

but several bankers and

The profile is as follows:

developers.

In-house personnel

3

Educators

3

Property managers

1

Developers

3

Bankers/financiers

3

Academics

3

Public officials

2

Historic preservationists

1

Lawyers

1

Entertainment Managers

1

There is an obvious bias toward the private sector.
reflecting the stance of the Strategy in respect
development.

to economic

but also the Mayor's personal involvement with

real estate and the acknowledged dominance of the private
sector in the affairs of downtown
commercial district).

However.

the neighborhood organizations.
groups.

tenant groups.

agencies.

(which.

after all.

is a

there were no invitees from
citizen groups.

minority

the numerous non-profits or other City

The Strategy was couched in terms which were to

incur minimal costs to the City.

with great emphasis placed

upon capital investment from the private sector.
was a forum.

Here.

then.

not only in which the idea of a new downtown

plan could be sold.

but in which with the needs of the

private sector could be identified and a plan tailored
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accordingly with direct private involvement.
recognized that it did not have the funds
The Strategy recognized this

(indeed.

to

The City
'go it alone'.

the Carr-Lynch-Levine

Strategy was unique in the history of Providence planning in
that

it assumed the availability of neither state nor federal

funds).

The Task Force was seen by the City as the only

means by which a workable plan and a successful
implementation vehicle could be generated.

8.5

The deliberations of the Task Force
According to what was anticipated to be only a summer-

long agenda.

the Task Force was scheduled to meet on four

occasions between July 15 and September 9.

1986

The consultants had presented their findings
assemblies of various downtown organizations.
Chamber of Commerce.

(Figure 8.4).

to two invited
including the

in early June and early July.

Feedback

from the post-presentation questionnaire had been analyzed
for submission to the Task Force by mid-July.

Meetings of

senior departmental staff would summarize the Task Force's
findings and provide policy documents for the Mayor by midSeptember.

1986.

The process.

as defined in Figure 8.4.

would move from response and feedback mechanisms.
devices.
20.

via input

to final policy generation from June 1 to September

With the agenda circulated among appointed members.

the

initial Task Force meeting took place on July 15.
It would be easy to condemn this process as insular and
undemocratic.

but when compared to the history of urban
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FIGU RE 8. 4

REVIEW OF PROVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
ATTENTION:
PROPOSED

DATE

PHASE 1.

TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS
MEETING
RESPONSE AND FEEDBACK MECHANISMS

6/4

Presentation by Melvin Levine (Consultant) and
Department of Planning and Development to the
Providence Foundation

7/1

Presentation by Carr, Lynch and Melvin Levine
(Consultants) to City Council, Urban Renewal Committee,
Historic District Commission, Redevelopment Agency,
Providence Preservation Society, Planning Commission

7/15

TASK FORCE - Initial meeting to discuss approach to
the Strategy, to study its major elements, and to
review feedback from first presentations and
questionnaires

PHASE II.

POLICY INPUT

7/29

TASK FORCE - Second meeting to critique the Strategy,
to review questionnaire feedback and to establish
most positive, workable elements

8/19

Department of Planning and Development Staff Meeting To initiate policy in respect to adoption of preferred
Strategy elements

8/22

TASK FORCE - Third meeting to establish final structure
of Strategy with particular emphasis on means of
implementation, the Providence Company, financing, and
the feasibility of a Downtown Neighborhood as a catalyst
for increasing market demand

PHASE III.

POLICY GENERATION

8/29

Department of Planning and Development Staff Meeting To define policies and proposals to be adopted

9/4

Completion of First Draft of downtown development
proposals

9/9

TASK FORCE - Fourth meeting to obtain final input on
proposals and policy determination

9/12

Department of Planning and Development Staff Meeting Finalization of proposals for Providence Development
Strategy

9/17

Submission of proposals to the Mayor
140

FI GURE 8.4 cont.

PHASE

TIME SCALE
1

I
II

III

June
15

July
30/1

15

31/1

August
15

31/l

September
15
30

+---------------+-------------+--------------+--------------+
*--------------------------*
*----------------*
*----------*

PHASE I.

RESPONSE AND FEEDBACK MECHANISMS

This initial period will involve a thorough investigation into the
validity of the Strategy as a 'downtown plan•, with emphasis upon whether
the integration of its many elements renders it a workable document.
The consultants' report will be examined in the light of its strengths
and weaknesses as perceived by yourself and the other Task Force
particip~nts.
!t is anticipated that a diverse range of views will be
expressed, but participants are encouraged to identify those issues which
directly relate to the practicality of the plan - will it fly? If not,
why not? Which elements have the greatest strengths ••• and deepest flaws?
Attention will be paid in the first meeting of the Task Force to the key
components of the Strategy: the establishment of the Providence Company;
the development of Class 'A' office space; the Attractions Strategy;
and the development of a 'Downtown Neighborhood'.
PHASE II.

POLICY INPUT

By this stage, some consensus will have been reached in respect to those
areas of the Strategy most actively to be emphasized and supported.
While the first meeting will have established an approach to the
Strategy, a more detailed critique (including the policy, planning and
financial implications) is now appropriate. Responses from the
presentations and the findings of the questionnaire (see example
enclosed) will provide primary feedback data from both the public and
private sectors. At this time, the Task Force should help to establish
the most positive, workable elements of the Strategy in order that the
Department of Planning and Development might initiate policy concerning
the adoption of preferred plans.
PHASE III.

POLICY GENERATION

The end of the sunrner months will mark the coalescing of a wide range of
opinions into a policy document for the consideration of the Mayor. The
Task Force will assist the Department of Planning and Development in
defining the polcies and proposals to be selected for final
recorrmendation. Again, participants are asked to look to the Providence
Company (its accountability and financing, in particular), office space,
attractions, housing and each sub-category of the planning scheme. It is
hoped that the Director of Planning and Development will be able to make
his submission to the Mayor by mid-September, 1986.
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renewal.

at least a considered approach was now being taken

to the direction and potential impacts of fresh initiatives.
An advisory body of acknowledged experts and powerful
downtown actors had been assembled and what they recommended
would be of considerable influence upon the Mayor as he
attempted to set downtown policy for his new term

(Paolino

was re-elected by a resounding majority in November.

1986).

The Task Force was presented with individual agendas for
None of these was adhered to.

each of its meetings.

clear that there existed factions within the group.

It was
some

members lobbying strongly in favor of a new City initiative,
others cynical about

the timing of the plan.

The first

two

meetings produced nothing in the way of concrete proposals
and after the third meeting.

a period of nearly three months

passed before the Task Force met again.
occurred on December 3.

1986.

The fourth meeting

Over an hour was spent arguing

over the accuracy of minutes taken by Arthur Markos at the
third.

By the end of the meeting.

a broad consensus had been

built around many of the Strategy's substantive elements
described in Chapter 4).

(as

but the issue of the Providence

Company was raised only briefly.
Charles Francis of Ryan Elliot Corporation.
development firm.

informed members that the timing of a new

agency was quite wrong.
environment.

given the current downtown

The Task Force decided to postpone discussions

regarding the implementation vehicle until 1987.
Amato,

a

President of Kates Properties,
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Richard

a property management

firm headquartered on Westminster Mall,

questioned the

Mayor's interest in the findings of the Task Force.

In an

article in the fEE~iE~E£~ ~E~EE~l on Saturday 30 November,
1986,

Paolino indicated that he was going to re-open

Westminster Mall and that he did not need an advisory panel
to tell him whether that was right or not.

The very validity

of the Task Force was brought into question and Arthur
Markos,

the Chairman, was forced to cite examples of the

"Mayor's sincere interest" in order to re-affirm the panel's
sense of purpose.
The points which did win almost unanimous approval in
the last two Task Force meetings are as follows:
1.

The Task Force will support efforts to bring a
multi-use,

retail development

(similar to that

previously proposed for the Outlet Building)

to

downtown Providence.
2.

Developing and marketing office space is premature.

3.

A private sector initiative along the lines of
the Carr-Lynch-Levine Attractions Strategy should
be encouraged.

4.

Design Review is desirable,

but the Task Force is not

qualified to make specific proposals.
term,
5.

For the long-

coordinated design review is desirable.

A residential neighborhood depends solely on supply
and demand.

Current land values do not permit the

supply of residences at a cost which would be
affordable to the type of individual/family who
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would wish to locate downtown.
6.

The majority sentiment is to leave Westminster Mall
closed to vehicular traffic at all times.

7.

The ring road will need more than merely improved
signage to work effectively.

Some form of physic.al

improvements will be necessary.
8.

The current political,
environments do not,

economic and inter-agency

at present,

indicate that a new

institutionalized management vehicle would be
appropriate.
Because the Task Force has been unable to progress
beyond the establishment of generalized agreement with
certain of Carr-Lynch-Levine's recommendations,

this thesis

proceeds with an analysis of the experiences of other
American cities in downtown development and,

finally,

with

proposals for a new public-private partnership for downtown
Providence.

Reservations about its success are expected.

Given the events of the spring,
1986,

summer and now the fall

there appears to be little hope of exacting a new

policy from City Hall.
proceed,

If the Administration decides to

despite opposition,

the Providence Company will

almost certainly die a swift deathr
wrote Chester Smolski.

"The time is ripe",

It is also wrong.

***
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"Anyone who has ridden a bicycle built for two
knows that while the balance of effort may shift
back and forth,
other pedals on,

one partner coasting while the
long distances can be covered

only by joint and sustained effort."
Katherine Lyall,
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1982

9.1

Introduction
"Cities have an air of permanence which is both real and

illusory.

Because they are built of concrete and steel,

their physical forms display the layers of time •••

But cities

have a social and economic dynamism which continually remakes
them,

sometimes very quickly."

1983).

(Susan S.

Fainstein et al,

Cities are a complex mosaic of social and economic

forces which confront the urban planner in a tangled web of
confusing trends,

the outcomes of which are a continual test

of his skills as researcher.

goal-setter and policy

Because there exist these "illusory" qualities to

generator.

the more visible physical fabric of the city.

the planner can

only succeed in the manner of his intervention by
understanding the relationships between the marketplace and
the impact of his actions:
environment;
brokerage;

existing milieu versus potential

current power-base versus more equitable

public over private

and private)

(or more realistically.

public

rather than public versus private.

The nature of the urban marketplace is inherently
conflictual.

a battle of interest groups.

of social groups.

In complying with his task of

generating policy does the planner.

the status quo.

and

each vying for optimal satisfaction and

individual goal attainment.

traditionally.

of coalitions.

as he has done

side with those forces best able to preserve
or does he innovate and attempt to find a

level of convergence between the opposing camps of diverse
interests.

private and public?
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Intervention is the only

means of effecting change.
controversial.
power and.

It demands of some the surrendering of

of others.

equitably.

Intervention is therefore

the humility to wield new power

Guarantees of equity are never cast in stone.

in re-defining the means and extent of intervention.
planner must

so

the

find a vehicle whose constitution sustains the

intent of goals over a prolonged period.
This chapter catalogues the attempts of planners and
their political mentors to institutionalize positive working
relationships between historically fractious
downtown communities.
'public interest'
into one fold.

elements in

In seeking a broader definition of

and in bringing private and public groups

urban municipalities have strived to achieve a

level of cooperation never before associated with central
city polities.

With the common goals of bringing economic

growth and people back to the urban core.

downtown planning

and management entities are attempting to bring life back to
the heart of the American city.

The final chapter in this

Research Project analyzes the effectiveness of the efforts
made in the case histories described below.

Has there been

true convergence of interests or has the concept of
interest'

been compromised in the name of advancing the cause

of free market economics?
permit

'public

Have goals been set

in order to

the status quo to prevail in an environment which has

developed to the detriment of its long term good health?
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9.2

Public-private partnership:

an overview

The problems and opportunities of cities have long been
matters of keen interest to the federal government.
response to them has
to

ranged from almost total laissez-faire

intense public subsidization.

holds that,

The

The position of this thesis

despite decades of national government

intervention,

little is actually known,

national urban policy,

by those who coin

about decision-making processes within

cities because most decisions are made by local leaders.
While cities do exhibit similar traits
flight,

suburbanization,

of minorities),

(for example, white

inner city decay and ghettoization

the response of local politicians has varied

dramatically from one urban area to every other.
The growth and visibility of the federal government
obscured the expansion of local government.
booms in the 1950s and 1960s,

suburban growth,

been noticeable even in the inter-war years,
exploded.

With economic
which had

suddenly

New local governments were formed in the suburbs

to provide roads and schools to support growing populations
at the urban fringes.

As a consequence,

the traditional

central cities were drained of middle class individuals,
and tax bases and,

at the same time,

jobs

were filled with a

poorer population of rural migrants who were predominantly
black.

Successive federal administrations responded to the

resultant problems of poverty,

health,

education,

unemployment and public safety in a manner which was
impressive more for its magnitude than its relevance.
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Seemingly,

not even the scope of federal programs was ever

entirely adequate to follow
Federal policy,
national level -

through with problem-solving.

by its very nature,

one rule for all.

the intent of federal
federal programs,

is applied at the

Yet the interpretation of

urban policy.

the implementation of

and the expenditure of federal

expedited by local mechanisms.

funds are

To venture that areal

disparities in socio-economic conditions have been compounded
by similar disparities in the wisdom of local urban policies
would be to overwork an already hackneyed truth.

But

increasingly city administrations are having to look to their
own resources -

both technical and financial -

with continued inner city decline.
federal

in grappling

Unable to rely upon

revenue sharing, with the contraction of the CDBG and

UDAG programs,

local administrations are looking to the

strengths of the private sector for collaborative efforts in
urban revitalization.
Much research has been conducted with regard to the
various aspects of urban society.
structure,

political institutions,

government

managem~nt.

including its social
economic development,

and

Many of the studies undertaken in the

1960s concentrated on the social factors underlying urban
decline.

Much of the work carried out

on economic forces.
'efficiency',
business'

in the 1970s focused

The 198-0s have brought such terms as

'practicality',

to the fore.

and

'running the town like a

There is a dilemma here in that

governments in capitalist societies carry out residual
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functions.

Residual.

that is.

because they are those

functions which will not produce a profit and are therefore
ignored by the private sector.
of Proposition 13

But the resounding victory

in California in 1978 dramatized a

nationwide mood swing in public opinion.
believed. was too expensive.

Government.

Also in 1978,

it was

federal grants to

state and local governments ceased their historic climb and
began instead to decline.

The election of Ronald Reagan in

1980 and the near unanimity in Congress in 1981 in favor of
restraining federal budget growth confirmed the change in
public mood.
Getting a return on the dollar is today becoming a
priority in many areas which have fallen to the public
domain:

education.

social services.

and neighborhood development.

infrastructure provision.

Grants are being supplanted by

loans which are repayable to the municipality with interest.
Per pupil cost is the bottom line in educational
subsidization.
first

Sewers and mains water supplies are driven

through those areas with economically viable uses

hungry for improved infrastructure.

As the new.

technology industries become more and more

high

'footloose'.

municipalities must continually bow to their requisites

(for

fear of losing them to more attractive towns at the next exit
on the interstate).

With federal

government urban policy

contracting and private industry free to take its jobs where
it pleases.

how does local government reconcile its duty to

preserve an acceptable level of living for its citizens with
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the hostile reality of current economic circumstances?
Persuasion is a key factor.

By coaxing the private

sector to behave in a manner conducive to the wider public
interest. while convincing business that
to be derived from a stable downtown.

there are benefits

a municipality can

overcome many of the financial constraints to achieving
growth.

Injections of capital come from private rather than

public sources.

There has always been a concern,

of local governments.

that specialized but

on the part

interdependent

business activities have not automatically integrated
themselves into a smoothly functioning system.

either within

urban regions or within the citywide economy.

Private goals

are geared to profit.

not public well being.

It is natural that local government.
expression of collective action.

the people's

should today be called upon

to respond to economic fragmentation as manifested in the
city core.

The same pragmatic tradition that has guided

urban organization for a hundred years must now respond to a
federal policy vacuum in the inner city environment.

A

rethinking of the roles and relationships of the public and
private sectors must come from the public sector.

The

private sector will happily go on making profits for itself
because profit is its only policy.
Whether the vehicle for finding common ground between
diverse urban interests is private.
profit.

self-help. volunteer.

public.

profit.

non-

or a combination of these.

cities are realizing the need to take the first
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step in

initiating a new order.

They are then taking a step back and

allowing new organizations to act as catalysts for downtown
change.

9.3

The sample of cities
The research for this chapter was consciously biased

toward those downtown organizations which appear to have good
track records.

The purpose of this thesis is to make

recommendations for a new management entity or public-private
relationship for downtown Providence.

While one would hope

to avoid the pitfalls encountered by less successful
agencies.

those which have achieved measurable success offer

excellent models upon which a Rhode Island prototype might be
based.
The International Downtown Executives Association
publishes a list of what it calls
Organizations'

(1981).

'Downtown Improvement

Its most recent enumeration found 81

agencies in cities as diverse as El Paso.
North Dakota.

Texas and Fargo.

Table 9.1 shows that 88 percent of them dealt

with planning and development issues. while Table 9.2
illustrates that a three-way split occurs between those
agencies which are city adjuncts.

those which are non-profits

and those which are independent 501-C.3 organizations.

The

information published by the International Downtown
Executives Association served as a guide in identifying those
case studies most pertinent to formulating a partnership
for Providence.

153

TABLE 9 .1

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF ORGANIZATION
Population Category

Planning & Development

Pranotion

Parking

Less than 50,000

88 %

12 %

0 %

50,000-99,999

69

23

8

100,000-149,999

88

0

12

150,000-249,999

100

0

0

250,000-499,999

93

7

0

500,000-one million

83

17

0

100

0

0

Over 1 mi 11 ion
AVERAGE FOR
ALL CATEGORIES

Source:

88 %

10 %

International Downtown Executives Association, 1981
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2 %

TAB~( 9J.
TAX STATUS
OR NIZATION

Population Category
Less than
50,000

50,000- 100,00099,999 149,999

150,000249,999

250,000499,999

Over
500,000

Status
17 %

0 %

0

17

0

0

0

6

33

8

50

18

27

6

For Profit

0

0

17

9

0

0

501 (c) (3)

20

17

0

18

7

24

501 (c} (4}

7

17

17

18

7

6

501 (c} (6)

7

8

17

9

40

35

City Agency

13

17

0

0

0

6

7

0

0

0

0

6

Non-Profit
Non-Profit
Taxable
Ex en pt

Taxing
Authority

13 %

AVERAGE FOR ALL CATEGORIES:

Source:

Non-Profit
Non-Profit Taxable
Ex en pt
For Profit
501 (c) ( 3)
501 (c) (4)
501 (c) (6)
City Agency
Taxing Authority

27 %

20 %

12 %

16 %
4
21
7
16
11
21
8
3

International Downtown Executives Association, 1981
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The four cities selected are Baltimore,
Pittsburgh,
Oregon.

Pennsylvania,

Atlanta,

Georgia,

Maryland,
and Portland,

Unique in their geographic locations,

population sizes,

their

their industrial and demographic histories,

and the form taken by their downtown revitalization and
management efforts,

each has been successful in coordinating

the public and private sectors to promote growth.
The Baltimore Citizens Planning and Housing Association
(CPHA),

a group of concerned citizens wishing to improve the

quality of life in downtown neighborhoods
Rouse),

(including James

was responsible for stimulating business interest in

establishing the Greater Baltimore Committee

(GBC)

on to play a key role in downtown revitalization.
the GBC and its offshoot,

which went
In 1957,

the Committee for Downtown,

jointly

raised $150,000 and contracted a professional planning group
for the development of a master plan for downtown renewal.
The result was the much-vaunted Charles Center Project.
Pittsburgh's

'Renaissance I'

period owes its origins and

support to the Allegheny Conference on Community Development
(ACCD).

The ACCD provided the agenda,

planning and capacity

that evolved into the projects of Renaissance I
recently,

and,

more

the continuation of the scheme in the form of

Renaissance II.
The third case study describes how an active Chamber of
Commerce provided powerful leadership as reflected,

for

example,

in the enormously successful Forward Atlanta

program,

an advertising campaign to attract business to
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Atlanta.
Progress

In the 1970s.
(CAP).

initiative shifted to Central Atlanta

a group composed of the city's top business

executives. which has been instrumental in sustaining growth
in that city.
Portland is perhaps the most unique of the case studies
in the unusually active role played by neighborhood
organizations.

It was the lack of an organized downtown

business group that spawned the neighborhoods into action and
the development of the 1972 downtown plan.

The revisions of

the plan up to this time are noteworthy for the high degree
of public participation permitted.
In selecting the four communities.

it is hoped that a

wide range of elements will emerge as contributing to the
success of a prototypical management agency.

Several key

factors were looked for in estimating the likelihood of the
case studies to contribute to planning practices in other
cities.

These might be summarized as common elements of

local initiative

(it should be reiterated that these agencies

come from local and not federal origins):
culture;

a positive civic

a realistic and commonly accepted vision of the

community;

effective pre-existing building-block agencies;

a network among key groups and actors which promotes
communication of ideas;

the nurturing of entrepreneurs;

and

continuity of policy from the inception of a strategy and its
implementation vehicle up to the point when its role is
clearly defined and operational.
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9.4

Public-private partnership in Baltimore,

Maryland

The history of public-private partnerships in Baltimore
goes back more than thirty years and spans a large number of
projects,

ranging from economic development to housing

rehabilitation.

The success of these efforts can be traced

back to the work of two organizations,

the Citizens'

Planning

and Housing Association and the Greater Baltimore Committee.
After spending decades in the shadow of the nation's
capital, Baltimore is beginning to emerge as a vibrant city
in its own right.

National publicity surrounding the Inner

Harbor renovation and Harborplace has given the city a clear
identity and independent status.

Baltimore is perceived by

its planners as a city of character:

a success story worth

telling in other cities.
In Baltimore most civic and private entrepreneurial
leaders can trace their expertise back to membership in a
single non-profit organization.
Housing Association
came in 1941

(CPHA).

the Citizens'

Planning and

While its initial foundation

(as a response to city health issues),

potential was only fully

its

realized during the social turmoil

of the 1960s when inner cities were rioting against social
injustice.

From its inception,

the body viewed itself as a

group of concerned citizens intent upon improving the quality
of residential neighborhoods through the use of volunteer
action.

CPHA proceeded to set up more than 150 voluntary

neighborhood improvement associations throughout the city.
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From humble clean-up and fix-up efforts.

these associations

grew into well-coordinated advocacy groups.
The mid-1950s saw outcries from the wider city
population about alleged corruption among civic officials.
As a response.

the City administration agreed to greater

community participation in the operations of the Housing
Authority and the Redevelopment Agency;

the two bodies were

merged into the Baltimore Urban Redevelopment and Housing
Agency

(BURHA).

a largely volunteer group of professionals

and advocates founded in 1957.

The consolidation of all the

city's redevelopment and physical development resources

into

one agency was an unprecedented step in American cities.
the administration went further -

But

the Department of Public

Works was later added to BURHA to form the present-day
Department of Housing and Community Development

(HCD).

HCD

is an extremely powerful and effective agency which fostered
high standards of technical and professional expertise.

Many

of its early pioneers went on to work as senior officials for
the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).

This strong background of two decades of public

spirited citywide planning and development policies has
created a "stability and unity of purpose within the public
sector which has undoubtedly been a key factor in the
successful pursuit. with substantial private sector
participation.
Berger.

of long-range development goals"

(Fosler and

1982).

CPHA's active support for the creation of a single.
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integrated development agency.

HCD.

carried over into

establishing a political consensus for the need for a
specialized branch dealing solely with downtown issues.
CPHA.

together with HCD,

The

set the stage for genuine public-

private partnerships in the 1970s and 1980s.

Their vehicle

was the Greater Baltimore Committee which today looks beyond
the problems of housing and community affairs to the wider
issues of central city commercial development and downtown
revitalization.
The Greater Baltimore Committee

(GBC)

has been the

agency responsible for mobilizing business initiative in
support of downtown renewal efforts.

However.

goals to fruition

despite the presence on

took several years.

bringing its

its board of such business success-stories as Willard Rouse.
Robert Levi and Guy Hooday.
state:

The GBC's own records

(1980)

"Reactions from the business community ranged from

disinterest to outright opposition.

Some expressed the

concern that the proposed organization would duplicate the
Association of Commerce

(the local Chamber of Commerce) •••

The local press also greeted the rumors of the new group with
skepticism."
The new organization was intended as an elite group
consisting of the chief executive officers of the one hundred
largest corporations in the Baltimore Metropolitan area.
specific statement of philosophy was issued.
purpose was set down:
the government •••

No

but a pragmatic

"GBC will function as a citizen arm of

it could provide the necessary business and
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financial

expertise to help implement city projects;

it could

provide accurate and complete information on their necessity
through surveys and studies and overcome opposition;

finally,

it would exert whatever possible pressure on the government
to get approval for necessary
should be

'action now'"

improvements •.•

Our watchword

(Greater Baltimore Committee,

1980).

The newly formed GBC quickly settled on a priority
agenda which unashamedly focused on economic development
issues:

transportation improvements,

new Civic Center.
slum clearance.

port development and a

Of a lower priority were pollution and
The Committee adopted the framework of the

CPHA and worked through a system of subcommittees.
Rouse,

who went on to design and develop vast

so-called 'festival marketplaces',
of the Urban Renewal Subcommittee

James

inner city

was appointed chairperson
(through which the GBC's

support of the Charles Center and Inner Harbor projects was
orchestrated).
The Greater Baltimore Committee had an immediate impact
on the development of a privately financed master plan for
the downtown area.
legislature,

When the plan was adopted by the

it realized that in order to demonstrate its

effectiveness the Committee would have to focus

on one or two

smaller projects which would awaken the interest of the city
population and gain the confidence of the City if successful.
Charles Center,

for which private capital was quickly raised,

was an unqualified success in terms of commercial development
and infrastructure improvement.
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More importantly,

the

project gained massive media exposure with full
the development attributed to the GBC.
to

credit for

The Committee went on

initiate and develop a number of small scale projects,

well as the impressive Inner Harbor scheme,

throughout

as

the

late 1970s.
As an example of well-coordinated private sector
involvement in city planning and development,

Baltimore

presents a long history of continuity in the sharing of
responsibilities between power brokers,
public.

Clearly,

the GBC was intended to be a non-profit

private enterprise.
however,

be they private or

The beneficiaries of its actions,

have been the city's businesses rather than its

citizens.

The people of Baltimore probably feel

that Charles

Center is more desirable than the decaying wasteland it
replaced.

But within the context of a privately-sponsored,

privately-executed,

downtown plan,

the goals for development

were to render stagnating land uses profitable once more.
The citizens of Baltimore now have festival marketplaces,
harborfront vistas,
specialty stores.
economic.
for itself.

Clearly,

landscaped walkways and numerous
The changes have been physical and
the GBC has fulfilled the goals it set

Almost entirely with private money,

the city of

Baltimore has been given a centerpiece; a worthy
demonstration of capitalism organizing to preserve the status
quo,

but in a fashion acceptable to those with an eye for

aesthetics rather than equitable function.
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9.5

Renaissance in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
During the nineteenth century.

the city of Pittsburgh

evolved from a military post to being one of the n a tion's
most

important industrial centers.

As early as 1850,

a

larger share of Pittsburgh's population was involved in
manufacturing than in any other U.S.
1982).

In contrast,

throughout

city

(Stewman and Tarr,

the twentieth century,

manufacturing growth in the city and the region has declined
as the region's advantages to growth markets -

cheap mineral fuels and access

weakened.

Since the end of World War II,

the city's overall manufacturing employment has decreased
markedly from approximately 50 percent of the total workforce
in 1940 to 25 percent in 1980
1940,

1980).

(U.S.

In the same period,

Bureau of the Census,

the total population

declined from over 700,000 to less than 400,000.
Public-private partnerships are not unique to the
twentieth century in Pittsburgh.
the city aided private firms

In the nineteenth century,

in constructing railroads and

began helping housing developers by providing sewers,
and water in new subdivisions.
of partnerships
as

But the most vigorous period

(before the institutionalized program known

'Renaissance I')

came earlier this century.

citywide voluntary organizations Allegheny County,
Commission -

streets

Three

the Civic Club of

the Chamber of Commerce,

and the Civic

became involved with urban improvement projects.

Their aim was to improve the inferior social,

environmental

and political conditions that were direct by-products of the
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city's industrial development.
Pittsburgh's philanthropic

industrial classes set a

pattern for social intervention policy which acknowledged
that social.

as well as economic.

needs had to be addressed

in order to promote a stable urban community.

The voluntary

associations cooperated with successive city administrations
in generating a centralized educational administration and in
revising the electoral system.
realistic goals.
transportation.
improvements.

Institutional changes seemed

In the more substantive areas of
city planning.

flood control and housing

little substantive change was implemented:

the

forces of localism. vested economic and political interests.
weak enforcement capabilities.

and inertia prevented change

in spite of corporate and financial leaders'
It was.

once again.

support for it.

the private sector which drove the

movement for coordinated urban revitalization in the 1940s
and 1950s.

A number of independent private organizations

were established to reverse the entrenched pattern of decline
-

The Citizens'

Committee on the City Plan

(the CCCP later

evolved into the Municipal Planning Association).
Triangle Commission

the Golden

(a branch of the Chamber of Commerce

geared to halting decline in city ieal estate values).
the Allegheny Conference on Community Development
the three key private catalysts in this period.

and

(ACCO)

were

The years

that followed the establishment of these organizations in the
mid-1940s witnessed the development of diverse revitalization
projects which together are known as
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'Renaissance I'.

Redevelopment projects could not begin without the state
Without consulting the

passing enabling legislation.

Allegheny Conference or the other Pittsburgh private
organizations.

the Pennsylvania State Legislature passed a

Housing and Redevelopment Act and supporting legislation in
1945 and 1946 which became known as

'The Pittsburgh Package'.

Because of problems with initiating the intent of the
enactments.

the ACCD lobbied strongly for further legislation

which would serve its social purposes.
of ten proposed bills were passed.
smoke-control legislation.

expansion

creation of a parking

establishment of a county traffic and transit

study commission.
Department.

nine out

They involved county

county refuse disposal.

of county control over subdivisions.
authority.

As a result.

founding of the Parks and Recreation

and broadening the Pittsburgh tax base to include

sources other than real estate.
At last.

the legislative infrastructure for implementing

meaningful social and economic programs was in place.

An

example of how social and environmental forces cooperated
with one another came with the founding of the United Smoke
Council of the Allegheny Conference on Community Development.
a sub-branch of the ACCD.

The Conference helped the City try

to moderate its impact on low income domestic fuel users by
keeping an inventory of low-volatile coal and arranging for
release of metallurgical low-volatile fuel by the steel
companies if supplies ran low.

On its part.

the City's

Bureau of Smoke Prevention followed a policy of education and
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cooperation in enforcing the law against domestic and
industrial fuel users
adherence.
Tarr.

rather than insisting on rigid

The result was a much cleaner city

(Stewman and

1982).
In the arena of economic projects.

partnership was equally impressive.

public-private

Point Park and Gateway

Center are examples of cooperation between diverse interest
groups in the areas of legislation.
implementation.
Gateway Center.

Point Park.

funding and

a recreational open space.

and

a commercial redevelopment project. were

conceived as complementary components of one plan.

In

recognition of the contributions being made by the ACCD in
revitalizating downtown.

the secretary of the Pennsylvania

Department of Forest and Waters requested that the
Conference accept
plan.

responsibility for implementing the park

The 36 acre open space was brought into being by two

integrated actions.

First.

the design and layout conducted

by the Steering Committee of ACCD.

Second.

the passing of

resolutions permitting clearance of existing uses under the
Redevelopment Act by the City Council.

Together the public

and private sectors brought into being a green space in the
middle of a dense commercial zone.

The blighted area

abutting the park then emerged as the successful Gateway
Center which saw massive re-construction in the 1950s.
Bell Telephone Building.
22 story office building.

a parking garage.
the IBM Building.

The

a Hilton Hotel.
and the 27

story

Gateway Towers Apartments now stand where once there was
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a

rubble.
The environmental.
'Renaissance I'
period.

high-rise and park projects of

are the physical manifestations of this

But Renaissance involved a much broader range of

projects -

from sewage treatment plants and garbage

collection improvements to housing and industrial park
development.

Each included a varying mixture of public-

private partnership involvement in goal setting and planning.
In most programs.

the public sector role was primarily a

facilitating one.

but still of immeasurable importance.

The

private sector came to acknowledge the force with which the
city administration supported its controversial and sweeping
changes.

The chairman of the ACCD noted.

did not have to be elected to anything.

"The Conference
The public officials

who were supporting the Conference's program did have to come
up for

re-election".

on both sides.

There was.

Renaissance I

then.

a moderating influence

appears to have been a most

successful story in the public sector's ability to leverage
private capital and expertise in promoting central city
growth.

As in the case of all the sample cities, whether or

not the track record of each partnership meets the needs and
milieu of the City of Providence in 1986 will be addressed by
Chapter 10 of this thesis.

9.6

Progress in Central Atlanta. Georgia
Partnership in Atlanta has been a fairly

phenomenon.

Its selection for
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recent

this study was based upon the

similar regional and national economic climates which today
face downtown Providence.

On October 27.

of Atlanta elected a national figure
Young.
his

former U.S.

the citizens

to be Mayor -

Andrew

Ambassador to the United Nations.

radicalism did not at first

community.

1981.

While

appeal to the business

there is increasingly a sense that partnerships

between commerce and City Hall are taking off.
The current Atlanta economy was forged by two decades of
transformation.
1965.

During the relatively short period since

an agrarian Southeastern economy has been replaced by a

new industrial-technological society.

This fast paced change

is forcing Atlanta to come to terms with developing a public
management apparatus attuned to changing needs.
During Atlanta's new growth phase -

the 1960s and 1970s

the city made a quantum jump in economic development.

advancing from its traditional role as a regional
distribution.

transportation.

financial and professional

services center to that of a large metropolitan area with a
broad array of national economic responsibilities.

Although

the proportion of manufacturing jobs is relatively low.

the

economy is well diversified and has spawned entirely new
local industries such as the convention business
Atlanta excels nationally).

(at which

This is precisely the

diversification recommended for Providence by the consulting
firms

of Carr. Lynch Associates and Melvin Levine and

Associates in their Development Strategy

(1986).

convention business identified as a key element.

168

with

'Central Atlanta Progress'

(CAP)

was formed in 1967 by

the merger of the Central Atlanta Improvement Association and
the Uptown Association.

CAIA was founded in 1941 to

represent the interests of the business community.

Uptown

was founded in 1962 by the directorship of the First National
Bank and Sears-Roebuck to put private sector pressure on the
City to execute public improvements.

Neither had been

particularly successful prior to their merger into the CAP.
During the 1960s. Atlanta began its greatest building
boom.

and the famous

'Forward Atlanta'

national promotion

program was launched under the auspices of the Chamber of
Commerce.

Henson and King

(1983)

describe how Business Week

labelled Atlanta as "the Cinderella city of the 1960s".

The

CBD was far outgrowing its traditional boundaries and it was
clear that

the core demanded a special plan to address its

problems.

CAP immediately initiated the Central Atlanta

Study.

funded by a grant from the U.S.

Department of

Transportation and matching funds contributed by the City and
Central Atlanta Progress.

The City and CAP cooperated

throughout the planning process and set the tenet for
integrated public-private partnership for the next two
decades.

Balance was maintained because. while CAP was

representing Atlanta's most powerful businessmen.

it

concentrated on strictly professional and technical input:
its executive director was a professional planner.
The CAP took an even stronger professional role in the
planning of downtown when a conscious decision was made in
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1973 to hire Dan Sweat.
active politically.
done".

Jr.

to the top staff post.

Sweat's personal motto was "get things

He brought to CAP a vigor and impatience that remains

characteristic of the agency to this day
1982).

Very

(Fosler and Berger.

Sweat dealt directly with the Mayor and City Council

members.

He was seen as the mouthpiece of the business

community.

Quietly.

but with self confidence.

Sweat's CAP

usurped the traditional power base of the Chamber of
Commerce.
arose.

The transition was so smooth that no controversy

Indeed.

during the mid-1970s.

the working

relationship between the public and private sectors had never
been better.
To summarize.

Atlanta represents a case study in how to

succeed. without creating a new agency.

through improvement

of existing institutional interaction.

By improving

relations between key players in City government and key
players in a professional business organization.

CAP ensured

balance and continuity in the development of a dynamic
downtown environment.
important as

(if not.

Personalities emerge as being as
more important than)

the projects and

plans themselves.

9.7

Collaboration of diverse groups in Portland. Oregon
Ben Chieh Lin

(1970)

characterized Portland as

"America's Most Livable City".

The area's scenic grandeur

and some of the nation's strictest environmental protection
laws have earned Portland the description:
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"One of the

largest small towns left"

(Barbour.

1982).

Barbour describes

the generosity of public spirit among Portlanders.
survey he conducted.

the question was asked.

In a

"Do you feel

that public-private cooperation is necessary for economic
development to succeed?"

To which one respondent answered.

"Is there any other way to do it?"

Most of the public-

private debate has focused on the organizational dimension.
because the need for cooperation is taken by most people
as given.
Public policy in Portland might best be summarized as
'the politics of participation'.

The diversity of the city

is represented by 68 neighborhoods and some 54 separate
neighborhood associations.
process of urban planning.
For example.

Most of these participate in the
either directly or indirectly.

it is common practice for the City to consult

with the associations on all matters relating to recreation.
transportation.
Associations

and housing.

(ONA).

The Office of Neighborhood

established in 1974.

shares

responsibilities with the City Bureau of Planning and the
Portland Development Commission for intervention and change.
The three bodies combine to form an efficient vehicle for
implementing development projects.
commercial.

both public and

Consensus-building is the key.

Even the City's policy documents are grounded in
recognition of the importance of public-private partnerships.
The 1980 Portland Downtown Plan

(which.

incidentally. was

drawn up by the City and independent associations
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themselves.

and not by outside consultants)

views partnership as an

essential ingredient in expediting goals.
public sector.

but the private sector realizes

by-partisan cooperation.
Portland's Future'.
Club'.

stated:

Not only the

In its

the need for

'Report on a Vision of

the business agency known as

'The City

"Government and business relationships will

improve with creative and flexible approaches to problem
solving ..• Business and government will work together to set
goals to meet environmental and social needs •.•

Business

owners will recognize that a healthy economy includes highquality social.

cultural.

educational.

and recreational

institutions."
One example of public-private cooperation highlights the
well-orchestrated integration of traditionally diverse
groups.

The

'Saint Johns Business District Improvement

Program'

set down clear goals at its inception.

development company. Lord and Leblanc Inc ••

The

the City.

and the

Office of Neighborhood Associations agreed that certain key
ingredients must be recognized to ensure successful outcomes:
1.

The importance of cohesive and identifiable
neighborhood leadership

2.

The value of a comprehensive approach

3.

The need for a sense of place and identity

4.

The importance of capacity building and the
availability of expert staff.

These four statements of structure underpinned the economic
rationale of conducting the Saint Johns

172

revitalization

project.

Saint Johns was seen,

unique inner city neighborhood,
From the outset,

first

and foremost,

not as a

as a

'project area'.

the business community and the planners

believed that it was important to combine commercial
improvement with residential area conservation so that homeowners would not be in competition with merchants for City
dollars.

An economic analysis showed that

problem facing

the central

the business district was its inability to

capitalize on growth in the area's market demand.
expansion and change,

With

local business could capture a greater

percentage of the growing neighborhood market.

The final

product of the planning process was a comprehensive program
that set the basis for public expenditures in Saint Johns
over a five year period.
In respect

to implementation,

the planners detailed the

potential for public-private partnership in every element of
the plan,

thus maximizing capital resources and minimizing

wasteful duplication of roles.

Overcoming this stumbling

block has been a major set-back in development projects in
downtown Providence for years.

In Portland,

cooperative,

mutually beneficial management underwrites the key component
of the plan to this day:

physical improvements alone will not

solve the problems facing a central business district.

The

lesson of this booming Oregon city is that in order to create
a strong commercial central place,

it is equally important to

improve management of business operations and to actively
promote and provide new opportunities for private investment.
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As Portland has proved.

there is absolutely no reason why

this goal should not be commensurate with preserving
neighborhoods and community life.

as long as those

communities are represented in the planning and development
processes.

9.8

Organizational frameworks for successful partnerships
Defining success is something of a normative exercise.

Yet decisions will be made by politicians whether or not the
planner has had time to establish recommendations.

The four

case studies illustrate how city administrations can
facilitate wise long-range planning by involving business
and.

preferably.

neighborhood groups in every stage of the

decision-making process -

from goal setting to implementation

and management.
Because each city has achieved positive outcomes in its
quest for balanced cooperation between the public and private
sectors.

components of the four approaches will serve as a

prototypical model for Providence.
are summary system diagrams.

Figures 9.1

through 9.4

developed by this student.

which

serve to describe the institutional arrangements of the four
case study agencies within their political environments.
the reader's convenience.

they are appended to the end of

this chapter as they serve to illuminate some of the
discussions in Chapter 10.
Several key lessons are learned from this analysis of
other cities'

experiences.

Clearly.
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the milieu in which

For

planning is conducted is central to the chances of sustained
success.

An atmosphere of cooperation.

identified in Pittsburgh and Portland.
indicator of probable success.

such as
is a

that

reliable

In cities like Atlanta.

where businesses are aware of the benefits to healthy trade
when social and environmental issues are dealt with.
partnership is a natural extension of existing.

non-

institutionalized relationships.
Civic spiritedness on the part of City agencies and
Chambers of Commerce.

such as those in Baltimore.

firm basis for public-private partnership.
able to tap the financial

When cities are

resources of the private sector.

involving them in mutually beneficial projects.
definition of

provide a

'public interest'

is coined.

by

a broader

If state and

federal policies will no longer pursue interventionist urban
policies.

cities which ignore the possibilities of

partnerships among existing resource bases within their own
boundaries.

are those which will continue to see decline.

The task of the final chapter of this thesis is to
identify the strong and weak points of the different publicprivate partnership mechanisms discussed above.

In so doing.

criteria are set for a new cooperative relationship in
downtown Providence.

It would be the intention of this new

vehicle to identify and implement the desirable elements of
the consultants'
question.

plan and would provide an answer to the

'After the Carr-Lynch-Levine Development Strategy.

what next for downtown Providence?'

***
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FIGURE 9. 4
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN PORTLAND
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CHAPTER 10
A NEW APPROACH TO PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
IN DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE. RHODE ISLAND
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"A downtown management authority is no guarantee
of success.

It will require considerable work

and constant promotion •..
sure sign of decline.

but to do nothing is a

The city is moving forward

with much of its work in progress or on paper.

but

now the ball is in the hands of the private sector
to work concurrently with the city ••• "
Chester Smolski.
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1986

10.1

The time is ripe
It is apparent from the preceding case studies that a

major rethinking process is under way in the United States
concerning the appropriate roles of government and private
institutions in responding to human needs.

Fueled in part by

the reinvigorated conservative movement and public concern
over the cost and effectiveness of government programs in the
past.

efforts are being made to fashion alternative ways to

address the problems of downtown communities.
Chapter 6 identifies a list of some eighteen agencies
already in existence in downtown Providence.
Yet.

disappointingly.

Rhode Island.

there is little evidence to be found of

inter-agency cooperation even at the most rudimentary level
of information-sharing.

The fragmentation of roles in the

planning and management of the city core might well have been
politically beneficial to incumbent mayors

(no one agency

ever gaining sufficient jurisdiction or power to challenge
Administration initiatives or.
agencies).
Indeed.

indeed.

the actions of other

but the legacy constitutes inefficient chaos.

one of the major goals behind the establishment of

the Providence Local Development Corporation
Providence Industrial Development Corporation

(PLDC)
(PIDC)

and the
in the

early 1980s. was to guide potential investors through the
morass of regulatory.
existence.

advisory and financing bodies then in

Since that time.

neither of these agencies has

fulfilled the promise of coordinated commercial and
industrial development in the city.
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With the arrival of the Carr-Lynch-Levine Development
Strategy earlier this year,
point;

the City at last has a starting

a focus for integrated downtown management.

While the

financing outline and the accountability of the proposed
Providence Company have run into the expected political
wrangles over power brokerage,

the Department of Planning and

Development now has an opportunity to institutionalize
efficient downtown planning.

Setting aside the reservations

expressed throughout this thesis as to the capability of the
key actors to settle the issue in the prevailing political
climate,

this final chapter assesses the experiences of the

cities described in the preceding case studies and,

finally,

attempts to propose a prototypical management entity and
public-private relationship for Providence's core.

10.2

Identifying strengths in downtown management
While Baltimore is often held up as the most successful

example of downtown revitalization partnership,

its

prestigious Charles Center and Inner Harbor Projects were not
without problems in respect to their implementation.
The City contracted with Charles Center/Inner Harbor
Management Corporation to manage the mechanics of the
development process,

the CCIHMC having been created by the

City as a quasi-public organization to manage land
acquisition,

site preparation,

development deals.
Providence that

construction and package-

It will be noted by readers from

the problems catalogued below relate to
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implementation difficulties

rather than to the inter-

relationships among agencies.
acute and more

'downstream'

They seem,

therefore,

less

than the problems which might be

anticipated when institutionalizing partnership in the
capital of Rhode Island.
Three broad categories of negative impacts on plan
implementation in downtown Baltimore are identified:
opposition to a new network of urban expressways in and
around the CBD;

resistance of smaller businesses to

displacement from the renewal area;

and citizen opposition to

the siting of Harborplace on one of the last open spaces on
the waterfront.

In each case confrontation brought about

either defeat or victory for the City.
case,

But,

again in each

the overall plan and partnership arrangements survived.

As an example of how the City and the CCIHMC resolved
conflict,

the case of the Harborplace location is described.

By the time the Harborplace markethouse project was
announced,
'gap'

the city's residents had become accustomed to the

in urban development at this location on the

waterfront.

Because urban inf ill had been so thorough

elsewhere, Baltimoreans had developed the habit of
frequenting the remaining open spaces on the north and west
sides of harbor developments.

The most notable of local

events staged there was the Baltimore City Fair that brought
millions of people downtown each year.
When it was announced that part of the new project would
be located on one of the waterfront's last undeveloped tracts
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of land.

objections were rampant throughout the residential

community.

as well as the small nearby business community of

Little Italy.

The debate was finally settled when the City

agreed to hold a referendum.

The arguments on both sides

were put forward in the local media and in open meetings.
Before the ballot.

the City agreed to set aside Rash Field

and three urban park areas as recreational open spaces in
perpetuity.
Because of the frankness of all parties.
discussion.

a free flow of

and the popularity of the waterfront plans once

they were widely publicized.

the result of the vote was

overwhelmingly in support of Harborplace.

This case study is

one which demonstrates the benefits of a free-flow of
information and opinion.

from diverse quarters.

in building a

consensus of public and private viewpoints behind a downtown
plan.

It should be noted.

once more.

that the means of

implementation were rarely even questioned.

Baltimore had a

fine history of cooperation among its citizens and
businesses;

Harborplace bears witness to the progressive

nature of the relationship between the two.
The need for partnership arrangements to be flexible.
even highly dynamic.
Pittsburgh.

is demonstrated by the example of

The previous chapter noted several achievements

of the so-called Renaissance movement in the city.

But

between the distinct phases of the public-private partnership
(known as Renaissance I

and Renaissance II)

period of five years now known as
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there was a

'The Interlude'.

The crescendo of the Civil Rights Movement into what
amounted to a national emergency was felt
ethnic communities of Pittsburgh.

strongly among the

The difficult fiscal

conditions of northeastern and mid-Atlantic cities hit hard
in this western Pennsylvania metropolitan area at the same
time.

Large scale

'physical fabric'

developments.

heavily

subsidized by the federal government.

began to wind down.

Perhaps as a

an independent mayor.

result of these factors.

whose motto was "I'm nobody's boy". was elected.

All this

marked the beginning of the unsettling period known as The
Interlude.
No-one has ever suggested that development came to a
halt.

nor that public-private partnerships came abruptly to

an end.

Rather.

although Renaissance I

gradually dissolving.

partnerships were

a major new type of partnership -

appropriate for its time -

was being shaped:

social and

organizational cooperatives between the public and private
sectors.

Three specific areas of change emerged:

with the previously ignored black community;

new links

the

reformulation of urban renewal policies into positive housing
programs;

and the improvement of efficiency within the city's

government.
Perhaps the axiom that applies to Pittsburgh (and should
now be applied in Providence)

is that winning the battles is

not half as important as winning the war.

In-fighting among

competing groups never achieves the results of striving for
long-term.

apparently unattainable.
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goals.

The leaders of

governments,

agencies,

partnerships must

and companies come and go.

City

therefore be willing to overcome the

stigmas of traditional inter-group relationships and take
account of new personalities,

work habits,

technologies and

changing patterns of policy among groups.
It is a tribute to Pittsburgh that,

despite the flux of

national turmoil which gave rise to the local Interlude
period,

three major public-private brick-and-mortar

developments were successfully executed during this time:
rapid transit system,

new bridges,

a

and a large convention

center were all realized during this era of profound social
and economic change.

In attempting to formulate a new agency

and a new set of inter-agency relationships in downtown
Providence,

this thesis subscribes to the models of both

Baltimore and Pittsburgh in that each demonstrates the
preparedness to accept changing circumstances and the ability
to adapt

to changing demands.

Planning.

after all,

is

primarily about change.
In Atlanta.
be found.

the most

recent example of partnership is to

It too indicates that an ability to interpret the

political milieu and respond to changing community needs are
fundamental
partnership.

to achieving successful public-private
In 1973 two quite separate trends gave rise to

a power shift in the central city:

a black mayor with a

largely black administration came to office;

and the

neighborhoods and neighborhood organizations were emerging as
a new powerbase.

consolidated after successful opposition to
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highway construction during the preceding three years.

It is

difficult to determine whether a conscious decision was made
by Central Atlanta Progress to strengthen its capability to
meet

these and other problems.

enlarged.

but . the beginning of an

broader based CAP was under way.

The transition of power away from the traditional
Chamber of Commerce to Central Atlanta Progress was never
seen by local businessmen as a threat to the status quo.

Few

could argue with the credibility of CAP's sole criteria for
membership:

a willingness to work for the collective

interests of downtown.

CAP began to pride itself on being a

reservoir of power and action.

Besides.

it carried out much

the same program as had the Chamber of Commerce.
greater efficiency and greater popularity.

but with

The key lesson

for Providence policy-makers is that operations in Atlanta
are carried out by experts in the problem area at hand.
regardless of the titles or job descriptions of individuals.
If downtown Providence agencies could acquire.
cede power where necessary identified problems -

and later.

according to the needs of

surely the progress would be sufficient

to justify the emergence of new forces.

If an agency like

the Providence Company were given time to prove its worth (in
social as well as dollar terms).

the benefits of partnership

would be undeniable and unanimously accepted by doubting
individuals from both public and private sectors.

How can

officials expect real change if they will not set up a
mechanism to facilitate it?
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The final case study.

that of Portland,

presents a very

positive view of neighborhood participation in social and
economic development projects.

Few cities can have witnessed

the flourishing of common interests between so many different
power bases.

As is found in each of the case studies

is patently not the case in Providence).

(and as

the political milieu

of Portland has a long history of cooperation and consensusseeking.

Each party clearly recognizes the benefits of

compromise -

on all sides -

in mediating development disputes

and achieving mutually beneficial outcomes.
George Barbour.

Jr.

(1982).

writing on Portland,

notes.

"Most of the public-private debate has focused on the
organizational dimension,

but such cooperation has an

important human dimension ••• When the institutional
framework •••

is stripped away. what is left,

people cooperating with people."

basically.

is

The lesson learned form

Portland is that ceding power is equally as important as
acquiring it.
development.
policy.

Only through moderation can downtown
sensitive to all groups to be impacted by

be achieved.

safeguards'

To this end,

certain 'equity

are built into the prototypical model for

Providence ventured by this chaptei.

10.3

The Downtown Development Task Force redefined
Sub-section 10.4 presents the key recommendations of

this document:

the Providence Company and a new set of

inter-agency relationships among existing downtown
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organizations.

But the means by which this new entity will

come into being are probably as important as the entity
itself.

Unless

there is a solid coalition among vested

interests from the outset,

any attempt by the City to

institute a fresh approach will last no longer than the
initial outrage it will engender.
ignored and,

through isolation.

Quite simply.

it will be

be rendered useless.

The purpose of re-stating this fact before outlining the
form and structure of the proposed Providence Company is to
admonish local officials and captains of industry for their
fragmentary.

self-serving actions in recent decades.

Because

of its long history of fractious politics and the exclusivity
of its agencies.

Providence shares none of the benefits which

enabled Baltimore.

Pittsburgh.

their partnerships a reality

Atlanta and Portland to make

(see Chapter 9).

The timidity

and over-sensitivity of the Department of Planning and
Development must cease.
current opportunity.

This large agency must seize the

in the wake of the Carr-Lynch-Levine

Development Strategy.

to catalyze a new partnership between
One way to commence this

the public and private sector.

process would be to arm its Task Force with a more equitable
representation of downtown interest groups and utilize it as
a tool to set up the new downtown entity.
Some damage to the credibility of the Task Force has
already been done.

As noted in Chapter 8,

she was brought into the fold
accomplis.

one member feels

to "rubber stamp" a fait

The Chamber of Commerce was far from pleased that
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the consultants were appointed and the Development Strategy
executed before they were involved.
that

It is hardly surprising

the reception of the consultants'

proposals for a new

management organization was luke warm throughout
sector;

the private

the businesses to be relied upon to both finance and

initiate projects were never directly consulted by the City.
This was a grave error.

but not

insurmountable if future

steps are taken with due courtesy to all parties.
The selection of new members for the Task Force should
take account of a wider range of both public and private
interest groups.

The Providence Foundation and Chamber of

Commerce must have a more significant voice.
the consultants'

particularly if

proposals for funding the new agency are to

be refined into an acceptable package.

Because office space

is instrumental in the phasing of the Development Strategy
(a form of which would constitute the Providence Company's
new Downtown Plan).

property owners and property management

companies should be better represented.
major banks.

Officials of all the

of at least vice-president standing.

should be

invited to take part.

especially as funding for

individual

development projects.

as recommended in the Strategy.

rely

heavily on private financing.
Also integral to coalition-building will be the presence
of non-profit organizations concerned with housing and social
issues.

as well as the continued presence of a senior

representative of the Capital Center Commission.

The

Department of Planning and Development ignored the tenants'
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associations and socially-oriented agencies in its selection
of Task Force members in June.
development is.

1986.

as the consultants'

If future downtown
suggest.

emergence of a "downtown neighborhood".

dependent on the

the rights of current

downtown dwellers must be fairly balanced against the
anticipated influx of young.
condominiumization.

urban professionals and

Representation of the academic community

is well served by the expertise of current members.

Glenn

Kumekawa of The University of Rhode Island and Melvin Feldman
of Brown University.
Kathleen Field.

Arthur Markos.

Thomas Moses and

the senior professional team within the

Department of Planning and Development.

should continue to

hold seats.
The re-aligned Task Force would consist of thirty
members with two sub-committees.

one addressing the elements

of the Development Strategy which should be prioritized for
implementation by the Providence Company.

the other

addressing the selection of members for the Providence
The nomination of members.

Company Board.

three from the

public sector and three from the private sector.

would then

be voted on by the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce.
respectively.

As described below.

the professional staff of

the Providence Company would be appointed by the Board and
most definitely not by outside parties.

By keeping the

political debate and power-play in the arena of initial goalsetting and agency formulation.
was established.

once the Providence Company

it would be free to execute its Downtown
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Plan independently of external forces.

Only the

constitutional checks of the Board's accountability to the
City and the Chamber would be required.

10.4

The Providence Company
The need for a separate planning and management agency

to deal solely with the interests of downtown Providence has
never been greater.

The model proposed by this section

attempts to take account of a number of key factors
formulating a relevant.
1.

in

timely organization:

Eighteen agencies and organizations dealing with
downtown issues already exist.

2.

None of these agencies has a particularly good working
arrangement with any other.

3.

There is much duplication of effort in some areas.
while others are ignored entirely.

4.

The public and private power bases are interminably
fragmented.

with no partnership entity dealing with

downtown currently in existence.
5.

The professional staff of the Department of Planning and
Development are few in number and greatly overburdened
with mandated day-to-day planning procedures.

6.

There has been no spontaneous

'internal'

effort to

institutionalize partnership in Providence.
7.

Other American cities have reaped enormous benefits
by promoting sustained public-private partnership.

The model is presented.

in summary form.
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in Figure 10.1.

FIGURE 10.1
THE PROVIDENCE COMPANY -- A MODEL
Joseph R.

Mayor
Paolino,

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Jr.

SECTORAL REPRESENTATION

I
Executive Board
PUBLIC
(Appoint 3)

Ratified by Council

I

I

-----1

1---- Chamber of Commerce

I
I
PIDC

1-------->

I
I
6
I
DPIA
I Member I Advisory
PF
I Panel
I
PPS I
I
GPCVB I
PLDC

I
I
I

PRIVATE
(Appoint 3)

I
I

PROVIDENCE
COMPANY
BOARD
to set policy
to adopt plan
to set agenda

<-----

DPD --------

Technical
Resource

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

PROVIDENCE COMPANY -

Private non-prof it agency <-

I
I
I
Permanent Planning and Management Staff
to consist of:

I
3 Professionals*
2 Clerical Support
- to recommend policy to Board
- to formulate downtown plan
- to generate and disburse funds
- to implement plan
- to manage downtown projects
(including infrastructure, maintenance.
and entertainment/functions at Action Strategy locations)

* One member of DPD to be permanently assigned to PC
* Two members to be recruited from outside the City
of whom one should be a fiscal/management specialist
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A detailed description is provided below.

Representation
There are two essential ingredients in the workability
of the model:
1.

The Providence Company would have two branches:

a Board

to set policy and receive input from other lobbyists/
organizations,

and a line agency in the form of a non-

profit designed to be free from direct external forces.
2.

The Board would have three representatives each from the
public and private sectors,
concept of partnership.

thus institutionalizing the

The appointment of a

chairperson would be by vote of the City Council and
Chamber Executive Committee.
The public appointees to the Board would be ratified by the
City Council

(and would therefore not technically by mayoral

appointees),

while the private members would be ratified by

the Executive Board of the Chamber of Commerce

(and therefore

not be puppets of key downtown commercial interests).
The non-profit agency would have three full-time
professional staff,
and Development

one drawn from the Department of Planning

(to ensure compatibility,

continuity in planning),

complementarity and

the others to be selected from a

nationally advertised search for planning and management
experts.

One of the two individuals hired from outside the

City would have extensive fiscal and management experience.
The professional staff would be appointed by the six Board
members,

free from the influences of both the Administration
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and the private sector.

This check is designed to protect

the entity from abuses from its very beginnings.

Two

clerical staff members would be hired independently of
of the public employee unions to allow for flexibility
promotions.

firings

and pay scales.

in

The City would be

required to provide secretarial and material support as
necessary.
While the Department of Planning and Development would
serve as a permanent technical resource

(its plans and data

sources freely available to the Providence Company
professional staff).
Panel

(OPAP)

an external Downtown Policy Advisory

would be established to transfer input from

existing agencies into the overall goals of the new entity.
The six member Panel would consist of the executive directors
or senior administrators of the six agencies which have
played the most significant role in the development.
planning.

management and preservation of downtown Providence.

The Providence Company Board would be req u ired to meet with
the Panel on a quarterly basis.
recommendations.

but woul d n ot be bound by its

The Board alone would decide what policy

best served the interests of downtown partnership.

Board

members would serve for four years and then be required to
stand for re-election.

The planning/management professionals

would have permanent positions.
majority vote of the Board.

but could be dismissed by a

The Advisory Panel would change

only if members were dismissed from the executive/
administrative directorships of their own agencies.
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Planning. management and funding
The purpose of the Providence Company would be to
implement those elements of the Carr-Lynch-Levine Development
Strategy selected and refined by the Task Force and.
by the Board.

to formulate the Downtown Plan.

Plan would be adopted by the Board and.
of a designated

later.

The Downtown

within the confines

'Downtown Development District'. would be the

substance of downtown planning for the next twenty years.
The Providence Company Board would be encouraged to adopt the
Downtown Plan within three months of its appointment.

a

period during which the line agency professionals would be
interviewed and hired in preparation for plan execution.
The content of the Downtown Plan would be assembled in a
similar manner to the current Development Strategy.

but would

exclude generalizations and concentrate on designated
development projects and infrastructure improvements.
Plan would be phased in three distinct sections.

The

as proposed

by Carr-Lynch-Levine.
This vehicle.

serving as the formal.

institutionalized

expression of partnership. would be free to enter into
development agreements with both City agencies and private
companies.

Its funding and means of loaning monies would

follow the Tax Incremental Financing proposals of the
consultants.

Whereas at present there is considerable

opposition to T.I.F ••

there is no superior means of

generating capital for improvements.
power.

In terms of ceding

this would be the private sector's major contribution
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to the concept of partnership and the validity of broad based
intervention in the free market.
In the long-term,

the benefits to be derived by commerce

from increased activity in the city core would far outweigh
the sacrifices of incremental tax levies.

10.5

Summary
It is hoped that

this thesis has made a sound case for a

new management entity in downtown Providence.

Section I

outlined the economic necessity for greater attention by
policy makers -

both public and private -

Rhode Island's capital city.

on the core area of

The initial chapters also

analyzed the work of the consultants and identified severe
shortcomings in their Development Strategy.
In attempting to overcome the inertia generated by the
mayoral elections and the poor handling of the Strategy

(from

its inception through the post-presentation review phase),

a

rational attempt was made in Section II to present a detailed
outline of what

the City might try next.

If Mayor Paolino's

Department of Planning and Development can use its Task Force
as a non-partisan tool to build a coalition around the
Providence Company and bring a lasting focus
downtown,

to bear upon

it will achieve what no Administration has ever

achieved in Providence:

a meaningful and effective

partnership between the public and private sectors.

***
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